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1. The title adopts a phrase used by Neil Hamilton to describe the evolution of right-
to-farm laws across the country. Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal 
Reflections on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
563, 577–78 (2013) (“[T]he reality is that many states took the idea and applied it much 
broadly to protect any livestock facility meeting regulatory requirements, even those in 
existence after the neighboring homes. This action, in effect, turned the laws into a ‘right 
to commit nuisance’ rather than a right to farm.”). 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of disputes between neighboring property owners, 
changing societal values and public policy concerns have shaped both 
common law nuisance and environmental law. In particular, disputes 
over agricultural land use provide an important touchstone for the 
evolution of property rights within a developing society. The 
underlying conflict between agricultural production and the property 
rights of neighboring landowners was evident in early English 
common law. In William Aldred’s Case,2 the Court of the King’s 
Bench recognized “[a]n action on the case lies for erecting a hogstye 
so near the house of the plaintiff that the air thereof was corrupted.”3 
A seminal case in nuisance law dating back to 1611, William Aldred’s 
Case helped form the foundation of nuisance law in the early common 
law.4  
Prior to the enactment of comprehensive environmental laws in 
the United States, the legal system relied principally on tort law 
remedies—such as those provided in William Aldred’s Case—to 
rectify environmental harms in this country.5 Even after the advent of 
environmental statutes, the common law of nuisance continues to 
provide an important legal tool for aggrieved landowners seeking to 
protect their asserted right to the enjoyment of their property.6 In 
North Carolina, the development and evolution of nuisance law as it 
relates to agriculture provides insight into the changing landscape of 
agricultural production in the state, as well as the relationship 
between common and statutory law. New laws restricting nuisance 
claims against agricultural producers unduly restrict the property 
rights of neighboring landowners and raise serious constitutional 
concerns. 
 
2. William Aldred’s Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b. 
3. Id. at 816; 9 Co. Rep. at 57 b. 
4. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some 
Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765–71 (1979) 
(discussing the development of nuisance law in English common law). 
5. Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort 
and Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 737, 738–39 (2011). 
6. See id. at 753–54.  
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The development of industrial agriculture in North Carolina has 
imposed an enormous environmental burden on rural communities. 
Over the past several decades, the agricultural industry in the state 
has transitioned from small, family farms to large industrial facilities, 
especially within the livestock industry.7 As a result, these industrial 
facilities, housing hundreds—if not thousands—of animals, have 
become concentrated in certain rural communities.8 Reports from 
rural residents living near industrial hog facilities reveal the burden 
placed on these communities: 
On the coastal plain of eastern North Carolina, families in 
certain rural communities daily must deal with the piercing, 
acrid odor of hog manure—reminiscent of rotten eggs and 
ammonia—wafting from nearby industrial hog farms. On bad 
days, the odor invades homes, and people are often forced to 
cover their mouths and noses when stepping outside. 
Sometimes, residents say, a fine mist of manure sprinkles 
nearby homes, cars, and even laundry left on the line to dry.9 
These and other anecdotal reports provide compelling evidence of 
ongoing environmental harm.10 However, over 400 years after 
William Aldred’s Case, landowners living near these agricultural 
operations in North Carolina no longer enjoy the same protections 
under common law nuisance. 
In response to growing concerns about the encroachment of 
urban development on agricultural communities, North Carolina and 
other states across the country enacted “right-to-farm” (“RTF”) laws 
to protect existing agricultural operations from nuisance actions.11 
Enacted in 1979, the original North Carolina RTF law provided 
preexisting agricultural operations with an affirmative defense to 
 
7. See infra notes 36 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
9. Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North Carolina, 
121 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A182, A183 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC3672924/?report=reader [https://perma.cc/FGD3-EYAJ].  
10.  See Letter from EarthJustice to Gina McCarthy, EPA Administrator, at 18–33 
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/North-Carolina-EJ-Network-
et-al-Complaint-under-Title-VI.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACL-PEUQ] (stating the grounds 
for a Title VI Civil Rights Act complaint against the North Carolina Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources, and documenting the adverse impacts of swine 
concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”) on residents in eastern North 
Carolina).  
11.  See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to 
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 118 
& n.108 (1983). 
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liability in a nuisance action, subject to certain limitations.12 As 
interpreted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the 1979 RTF 
law codified a “coming to the nuisance” defense for preexisting 
agricultural operations, designed to discourage subsequent residential 
landowners from bringing nuisance claims against such facilities.13 
While the original justification for RTF laws may have seemed 
reasonable at the outset, some states have extended these statutory 
protections well beyond their originally intended purpose.14 As a 
result, many of these amended RTF statutes have effectively created 
a “right to commit nuisance” as opposed to a “right to farm.”15  
The extensive protections afforded to agricultural facilities under 
RTF laws call the underlying justification for these laws into question. 
RTF laws not only interfere with the property rights of neighboring 
landowners,16 but may also restrict the efficient allocation of land 
use17 and render agricultural producers less sensitive to the effect of 
their operations on rural communities.18 The relative impact of these 
laws on agricultural nuisance suits has been difficult to quantify.19 In 
light of the continuing development of industrial agriculture, some 
courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have narrowly 
interpreted RTF statutes to address the equitable concerns of 
neighboring landowners.20 Thus, in spite of the statutory protections 
under RTF laws, some plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing successful 
 
12.  Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140–41 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	106-700 to -701 (2015)). See Grossman & Fischer, supra 
note 11, at 119. 
13.  See Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985); Grossman 
& Fischer, supra note 11, at 119–20.  
14.  See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; David Bennett, Right to Farm Laws Being 
Tweaked Across Nation, DELTA FARM PRESS (Aug. 7, 2013), http://deltafarmpress.com
/government/right-farm-laws-being-tweaked-across-nation?page=1 [https://perma.cc/L7GC-
4CEY] (noting Attorney Rusty Rumley’s views on various states’ RTF laws). 
15.  Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78. 
16.  See Terence J. Centner, Nuisances from Animal Feeding Operations: Reconciling 
Agricultural Production and Neighboring Property Rights, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 5, 6 & 
n.7 (2006); Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to 
Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1738 (1998). 
17.  See Centner, supra note 16, at 6–7 & n.10.  
18.  Id. at 6–7; Joshua M. Duke & Scott A. Malcolm, Legal Risk in Agriculture: Right-
to-Farm Laws and Institutional Change, 75 AGRIC. SYS. 295, 299 (2002) (observing that 
the existence of right-to-farm acts could create a perception of invulnerability from 
nuisance actions among agricultural producers that would affect decisions regarding farm 
management).  
19.  Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at 298–99, n.2 (noting the difficulty in obtaining 
data on unpublished cases or the number of agricultural nuisance suits filed and resulting 
uncertainty regarding the deterrent effect of such laws).  
20.  See infra Section II.C. 
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nuisance actions against agricultural facilities.21 In response, several 
state legislatures have expanded their RTF laws to effectively codify a 
“right to commit nuisance” for agricultural facilities at the expense of 
neighboring landowners and the surrounding communities.22  
Recent events in North Carolina shed light on this developing 
trend. On July 18, 2013, North Carolina enacted significant 
amendments to its RTF law, drastically expanding the protections 
from nuisance actions available to agricultural facilities.23 Under the 
amended RTF law, an agricultural operation may raise an affirmative 
defense to liability in a nuisance action regardless of whether it had 
undergone a change in ownership, size, or type of product produced.24 
As a result, agricultural operations may be able to benefit from these 
protections regardless of whether the facility actually preceded its 
neighboring landowners.25 
The legislation was enacted only weeks after the initial filings of 
nuisance suits against Murphy-Brown, LLC, a subsidiary of the pork 
producer Smithfield Foods, Inc.,26 for the operation of industrial hog 
facilities in eastern North Carolina.27 Over 400 plaintiffs filed claims 
 
21.  See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C. 
22.  See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78; infra Section III.A (discussing recent 
nuisance litigation and resulting legislative proposals).  
23.  Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858–59 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701 (2015)).  
24.  Id. The amended law also provides that a forestry or agricultural facility that 
employs a new technology or interrupts operations for less than three years may still 
benefit from the affirmative defense to nuisance actions under the RTF law. Id. 
25.  See id.; infra notes 209–220 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the 
changes within the amended statute). 
26.  Smithfield Foods is a $15 billion global food company, considered to be the 
world’s largest pork processor and hog producer. Company Profile & History, 
SMITHFIELD FOODS, http://www.smithfieldfoods.com/about-smithfield/company-profile 
[https://perma.cc/V9SQ-AAJA]. In 2013, the Chinese company Shuanghui International 
purchased Smithfield for $4.7 billion dollars. Christopher Doering, Smithfield Shareholders 
OK $4.7B Sale to China Firm, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:41 AM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/24/smithfield-vote-china-deal/2859551/ 
[https://perma.cc/3HB5-YGDU].  
27.  See Request for Prelitigation Mediation of Farm Nuisance Dispute, Exhibit B, 
Blanks v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-R-685 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2013); Will 
Michaels, N.C. Hog Farm Neighbors File Nuisance Complaints, WUNC (July 8, 2013), 
http://wunc.org/post/nc-hog-farm-neighbors-file-nuisance-complaints#stream/0 [https://
perma.cc/LBW3-U3U8]. Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff is required to file a request 
for prelitigation mediation prior bringing an agricultural nuisance suit. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§	7A-38.3(d) (2015). Indeed, a comparison of the timeline of the litigation to that of the 
proposed legislation suggests that the legislation was modified to ensure its applicability to 
the pending litigation. See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text. 
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in North Carolina state court against Murphy-Brown.28 The cases 
were subsequently re-filed in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of North Carolina.29 The district court has issued 
preliminary rulings,30 and, as of the writing of this Comment, the 
cases remain pending.31 Murphy-Brown has expressly raised the 
North Carolina RTF statute as an affirmative defense to liability in 
the pending litigation.32  
These cases may provide one of the first opportunities for courts 
to interpret North Carolina’s recently amended RTF law. In contrast 
to the landowner in William Aldred’s Case, some or all of these 
neighboring landowners could find themselves without a legal 
remedy. However, the exact scope of the protections afforded to 
 
28.  The complaints were originally filed in the North Carolina Superior Court, Wake 
County, on July 30, 2013. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Alderman v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 
13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2013). The complaints included as defendants both 
the “integrator” company that owned the hogs, Murphy-Brown, LLC, and various “local 
growers” who owned or operated the facilities where the hogs were raised. See id. at 4. In 
total, twenty-five complaints were filed in state court, including approximately 440 
individual plaintiffs. See Motion to Designate Case as Exceptional at 2, Alderman v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2013). The plaintiffs 
subsequently motioned to dismiss without prejudice the claims against the “local growers.” 
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Notice of Partial Dismissal at 1, Alderman v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 
No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2013). 
29.  With the remaining state court lawsuits pending, the Plaintiffs commenced the 
filing of federal lawsuits on August 21, 2014. See, e.g., Complaint, McMillon v. Murphy-
Brown, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-00155-BO, (E.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2014). The plaintiffs 
subsequently served and filed motions to dismiss without prejudice for the twenty-five 
pending cases in state court pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Plaintiff’s Notice of 
Partial Dismissal, supra note 28, at 1; Plaintiff’s Notice of Dismissal at 1, Alderman v. 
Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 13-CV-10322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2014). 
30.  In re N.C. Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 84714, at *16–17 (E.D.N.C. June 29, 2015) (granting in part and denying in part 
defendant’s motion to strike contents of the plaintiff’s complaints, ordering plaintiff to 
strike all references to Chinese government in legal arguments, photographs, and 
declarations); In re N.C. Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83157, at *78, *80 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for “annoyance” damages associated with temporary nuisance). 
31.  As of the date of this writing, twenty-six lawsuits are pending in the Eastern 
District of North Carolina, all of which name Murphy-Brown, LLC as the sole defendant. 
The complaints encompass over 500 individual named plaintiffs. See Motion to Designate 
Case as Exceptional, supra note 28, at 2. The lawsuits have been organized under the 
matter styled as In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR (E.D.N.C.). 
See, e.g., In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83157, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015). 
32.  See, e.g., Answer to Amended Complaint at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 
No. 7:14-CV-185-BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF no. 43 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are barred, 
in whole or in part, by North Carolina’s Right to Farm Act	.	.	.	. Murphy-Brown states that, 
upon information and belief, the farm at issue began operations more than one year 
before Plaintiffs’ alleged causes of action arose and that operations at that farm were 
reasonable and not a nuisance at the time they began.”). 
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agricultural facilities under the recently amended statute remains 
uncertain pending further judicial review.  
Contrary to the original legislative intent,33 North Carolina’s 
RTF statute in its current form fails to strike an appropriate balance 
between protecting the state’s farmland and preserving the inherent 
right of neighboring landowners to the enjoyment of their property. 
This Comment addresses the potential limitations placed on plaintiffs 
seeking to bring a nuisance claim against a neighboring agricultural 
facility in North Carolina. It also evaluates the constitutional concerns 
raised by the recent amendments to the RTF statute and advocates 
for a narrower reading of the statute in light of its underlying purpose. 
This Comment will proceed in four Parts. Part I will address the 
changing nature of the agricultural industry in North Carolina. Part II 
will discuss the original enactment of North Carolina’s RTF law and 
its subsequent interpretation in the courts. Part III will then examine 
the passage of the 2013 amendments to the law and potential 
statutory interpretations of the amended statute. Finally, Part IV will 
present the constitutional concerns raised by the North Carolina RTF 
law and advocate for a narrow judicial interpretation.  
I.  THE CHANGING NATURE OF AGRICULTURE IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 
While the preservation of farmland and agriculture remains a 
valid concern,34 the broad protections afforded to agricultural 
facilities under the RTF law ignore the current realities of agricultural 
production within North Carolina, particularly in regard to livestock 
production.35 Over the past fifty years, livestock production in the 
United States has shifted from traditional family farms toward mass 
industrial production.36 To benefit from the resulting economies of 
scale, producers have moved away from raising livestock in 
traditional pastoral settings towards raising animals within 
 
33.  See infra note 126 and accompanying text. As originally enacted, the North 
Carolina RTF law codified a “coming to the nuisance” defense for preexisting agricultural 
and forestry facilities. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 118–19, 119 n.109. As 
discussed in Section III.B, the amended RTF law would permit a much greater number of 
facilities to benefit from these protections. See infra Section III.B.  
34.  See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing loss of 
farmland and farms in North Carolina).  
35.  See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1736–37. 
36.  See Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!”: Model Legislative Efforts to 
Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 147, 147–49 
(2015) (discussing industrialization of agriculture in the United States). 
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“concentrated animal feeding operations” (“CAFOs”).37 Containing 
hundreds—if not thousands—of animals at a time,38 CAFOs are a far 
cry from the hog sty in William Aldred’s Case,39 posing serious 
environmental and public health threats to not only neighboring 
landowners but also surrounding community.40 Examining the 
transformation of the hog industry in North Carolina provides insight 
into the impact of CAFOs on their neighboring communities. 
A. The Rise of CAFOs and the Transformation of the Hog Industry in 
North Carolina 
Within North Carolina, the industrialization of agriculture has 
been most apparent in the development of industrial hog farming.41 
Beginning in the 1970s, the hog industry changed rapidly as it began 
to implement the CAFO model for hog production, which had 
already been successfully implemented in the poultry industry.42 The 
rapid expansion of hog farming in North Carolina was largely driven 
by the vertical integration of the livestock industry.43 The co-location 
of large processing and production facilities has resulted in an 
unprecedented concentration of hog farms within eastern North 
Carolina.44 In 1982, there was at least one commercial hog farm in all 
but one county in the state.45 By 1997, however, ninety-five percent of 
 
37.  Id. at 149. The EPA defines an Animal Feeding Operation (“AFO”) as 
“agricultural operations where animals are kept and raised in confined situations.” Animal 
Feeding Operations (AFOs), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-
afos [http://perma.cc/PP67-C6XX]. Medium and large AFOs are classified as CAFOs. 40 
C.F.R. §	122.23(b)(4), (6) (2015) (defining large and medium CAFOs, respectively). A 
medium CAFO may stable or confine between 200 and 699 mature dairy cows or between 
750 and 2,499 hogs weighing over 55 pounds. Id. §	122.23(b)(6). There is no upper limit for 
large CAFO operations. Id. §	122.23(b)(4). 
38.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
39.  See William Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 57b. 
40.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A185; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–57 
(discussing the effect of CAFOs on environmental and public health). 
41.  See John D. Burns, Comment, The Eight Million Little Pigs–A Cautionary Tale: 
Statutory and Regulatory Responses to Concentrated Hog Farming, 31 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 851, 854–56 (1996) (discussing the development of the hog industry in North 
Carolina).  
42.  See id. at 854 n.28; Shi-Ling Hsu, Scale Economies, Scale Externalities: Hog 
Farming and the Changing American Agricultural Industry, 94 OR. L. REV. 23, 30–34 
(2015) (describing transformation of the hog industry toward contract farming and large-
scale production); Nicole, supra note 9, at A186. 
43.  Burns, supra note 41, at 854–55.  
44.  Id.; see also Nicole, supra note 9, at A185–A186. 
45.  Nicole, supra note 9, at A185–A186. 
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the commercial hog farms were located in eastern North Carolina.46 
Currently, there are nearly 9 million hogs in the state.47 In 2012, 
North Carolina ranked second in hog production in the United States, 
with its yearly production valued at $2.9 billion.48 
While industrial hog facilities represent a substantial portion of 
the local economy in eastern North Carolina, they fail to provide a 
sustainable model for agricultural development in the state.49 The 
operation of CAFOs has had an adverse impact on small farmers50 
and has resulted in significant amounts of pollution within the 
region.51 As a result of the efficiencies achieved from the economies 
of scale, the development of these large industrial facilities has 
actually resulted in a decrease in the number of farms, as well as 
agricultural employment.52 Large livestock processors within the 
vertically integrated system, also known as “integrators,” generally 
contract with local growers to raise the animals and operate these 
facilities, while retaining ownership of the animals and proscribing 
strict specifications for their care and treatment.53 Commentators 
 
46.  Id. (citing Bob Edwards & Anthony E. Ladd, From Farms to Factories: The 
Environmental Consequences of Swine Industrialization in North Carolina, 1982–2007, in 
TWENTY LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY 153 (Kenneth Gould & Tammy 
Lewis, eds. 2008)). 
47.  News Release, U.S. Dep’t Agric., March 2016 Hog Report, (March 28, 2016), 
http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/release/HogRelease03.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FAZ-TZGV]. 
Over the past twenty years, the hog population has fluctuated between eight and ten 
million animals. N.C. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 43 (2015). 
48.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH12-4, 2012 CENSUS HIGHLIGHTS: HOG AND PIG 
FARMING 1 (2014), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources
/Highlights/Hog_and_Pig_Farming/ [https://perma.cc/4RD6-3KLD]. 
49.  The operation of CAFOs has been sharply criticized for externalizing the costs of 
production on surrounding communities, while receiving significant public subsidies. See 
Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 37 VT. L. 
REV. 1079, 1096–101 (2013) (providing a general critique of the economic model for 
CAFOs). 
50.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A185; Burns, supra note 41, at 857. 
51.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186; Burns, supra note 41, at 857–61 (discussing the 
environmental impact of industrial hog farming and its effect on North Carolina’s fisheries 
and tourism industry). 
52.  Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1135–36 (noting that hog CAFO construction creates a 
net job loss, while investment and profits from the projects largely bypass local 
communities); Burns, supra note 41, at 857 (noting that industrial hog facilities are less 
labor intensive and more centralized making it difficult for small independent growers to 
continue operating). For example, between 1991 and 1996, the number of hog farms in 
North Carolina decreased by 2,200. Burns, supra note 41, at 857. 
53.  See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 149 (describing the common ownership structure 
and control within the vertically integrated model).  
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have criticized these integrators for taking advantage of local growers 
who are bound by these contractual obligations.54  
The current waste management system employed by most swine 
CAFOs releases enormous quantities of untreated animal waste into 
the environment, posing serious environmental and public health 
threats to the surrounding communities.55 In most swine CAFOs, 
waste is collected in large, underground pits beneath the slatted floors 
where the hogs are kept.56 The CAFO operators periodically pump 
water through the storage area to flush the accumulated swine waste 
into large, open-air holding ponds, often referred to as “lagoons.”57 
These open-air storage ponds often store millions of gallons of swine 
waste.58 The waste slurry stored in these lagoons contains high levels 
of nutrients as well as pathogens and bacteria.59 The untreated swine 
waste is then sprayed, or otherwise land-applied, over designated 
“spray fields” surrounding the facility.60  
The resulting pollution is compounded by the sheer amount of 
waste produced at these facilities. Each hog can produce up to eight 
times as much waste as a human.61 The swine population in North 
Carolina is estimated to generate more waste in one year than the 
human populations of New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles 
combined.62 These facilities cause air, water, and odor pollution 
affecting not only neighboring properties, but also communities 
 
54.  See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 1, at 588 (noting that action is needed to “increase 
the protection for contract poultry and livestock growers to provide fair and equitable 
treatment and how to limit the use of ‘independent contractor’ claims by integrators to 
avoid legal responsibilities”); Nathaniel Haas, John Oliver vs. Chicken, POLITICO, (Jun. 1, 
2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/john-oliver-vs-chicken-118510 [https://
perma.cc/79ZG-5TYE] (discussing recent criticism of U.S. poultry production by comedian 
John Oliver and recent attempts by Congress to fund a USDA program to provide 
contract growers with additional protections). 
55.  Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–53.  
56.  Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1087. 
57.  Id.  
58.  Id. at 1084.  
59.  Id. at 1085. 
60.  Id. at 1087. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186.  
61.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186 (noting that hogs can produce between four to 
eight times as much waste as a human); Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1087 (noting that hogs 
produce approximately two to four times as much waste as a human). 
62.  See Hsu, supra note 42, at 43 (citing KATHRYN COCHRAN, JOSEPH RUDEK & 
DANIEL WHITTLE, DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE 
HOG WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 7 (2000)). Using data from 2002, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimated that the 7.5 million hogs located 
in five contiguous counties in eastern North Carolina produced approximately 15.5 million 
tons of waste that year. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944, 
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 21 (2008). 
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located miles upwind or downstream of these facilities.63 Swine 
CAFOs reduce neighboring property values and emit pollutants that 
threaten the physical and mental health of surrounding residents.64 
The concentration of these facilities within low-income and minority 
communities in eastern North Carolina has also raised significant 
environmental injustice concerns.65 
While state regulators and hog producers have attempted to 
address some of these concerns, those efforts have been insufficient to 
remedy the environmental impact of swine CAFOs on their 
neighboring communities.66 Following growing opposition to the 
operation of these facilities, North Carolina imposed a temporary 
moratorium on the construction of new industrial swine CAFOs in 
1997.67 In 2007, the state enacted a permanent ban on new hog 
facilities utilizing the traditional lagoon and spray field waste 
management system.68 However, these restrictions on swine facilities 
 
63.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A186–A187; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–57; 
Burns, supra note 41, at 861–64 (discussing the effects of water pollution from agricultural 
discharges and catastrophic spills from hog facilities in North Carolina). 
64.  Zboreak, supra note 36, at 151–52. See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A185, A187; 
R. Jason Richards & Erica L. Richards, Cheap Meat: How Factory Farming Is Harming 
Our Health, the Environment, and the Economy, 4 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCES. L. 31, 38–39 (2012) (discussing the reduction of property values near hog 
CAFOs).  
65.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A183–A184. In February 2015, the Environmental 
Protection Agency launched a civil rights investigation into potential violations associated 
with state regulation of these facilities. EPA Launches Investigation of North Carolina for 
Civil Rights Violations, EARTHJUSTICE (Feb. 25, 2015), http://earthjustice.org/news/press
/2015/epa-launches-investigation-of-north-carolina-for-civil-rights-violations-0 [https://
perma.cc/S7BU-VMFG]. 
66.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189 (discussing recent reforms and existing 
criticisms). In 2011, the general assembly passed legislation that permitted hog producers 
to upgrade their buildings without improving their waste management systems as required 
under the original moratorium. Act of June 13, 2011, ch. 118, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 220, 
220–21 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-806 (2015)). 
67.  Nicole, supra note 9, at A188. 
68.  Id. The Swine Farm Environmental Performance Act of 2007 required all new or 
expanded facilities to adopt “environmentally superior technologies” (“ESTs”) to 
significantly reduce emissions and eliminate waste discharges into surface and ground 
waters. Act of Aug. 31, 2007, ch. 523, sec. 1, §	143-215.10I, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 1678, 
1678–79 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	143-215.10I (2015)). The Act also 
established a lagoon conversion program to provide funding to farmers to convert their 
existing lagoons to implement ESTs. Id. §	1, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws. at 1680–83. Only two 
projects have been successfully completed under the program to date, however, and the 
general assembly has largely stripped the program of funding. See, e.g., N.C. DIVISION OF 
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
COMMISSION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAGOON CONVERSION PROGRAM 4 (2015), http://www.ncleg
.net/documentsites/committees/ERC/ERC%20Reports%20Received/2015/Department%20of
%20Agriculture%20and%20Consumer%20Services/2015-Oct%20Lagoon%20Conv%20Prog
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were notably weakened in recent years. Hog producers are now 
permitted to upgrade their existing facilities and recommence using 
many idled facilities without having to make improvements to the 
existing waste management systems.69 Even though alternative waste 
management technologies can and have been successfully 
implemented, the large majority of facilities continue to use the 
traditional “lagoon” and “spray field” system, citing cost as a primary 
concern.70 Swine CAFOs remain a significant threat to the 
environment and public health within their surrounding 
communities.71 In light of the environmental and social harm 
associated with these facilities, providing extensive protections for 
CAFOs under the RTF law loses much of its justification.72 
B. Making the Case Against Extending RTF Protections to CAFOs: 
North Carolina as a Cautionary Tale 
For those making the case against extending RTF protections to 
CAFOs, North Carolina serves as a cautionary tale. Commentators 
have argued that CAFOs should be excluded altogether from the 
nuisance protections afforded under RTF laws.73 In a 1997 opinion 
 
%20Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FRT-N8V4]. While a few facilities have successfully 
implemented ESTs, the overwhelming majority of existing hog farms still operate using 
the traditional lagoon and spray field system. Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189. 
69.  Act of June 13, 2011, ch. 118, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 220, 220–21 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-806 (2015)). In 2011, the general assembly passed 
legislation that permitted hog producers to upgrade their buildings without improving 
their waste management systems, as required under the original moratorium. Id. In 
addition, the previous regulations provided an exception for idled swine facilities to restart 
operations under the existing waste management system, provided that the facility had 
been out of operation for less than four years. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE. 2T.1302 (2015). 
However, the legislature recently extended this statutory exception from four to ten years. 
Act of Sept. 30, 2015, ch. 263, sec. 16, §	21(a), 2015 N.C. Sess. Law 513, 513–14. This 
change has raised concerns about the potential impact on neighboring landowners. See 
Gabe Rivin, Bills Allow Idled Hog Farms to Return Under Old Environmental Standards, 
N.C. HEALTH NEWS (May 22, 2015), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2015/05/22
/bills-allow-idled-hog-farms-to-return-under-old-environmental-standards/ [https://perma
.cc/F4UK-WL95]. 
70.  See Nicole, supra note 9, at A188–A189; Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1121–28 
(discussing the successful implementation of improved waste management systems). 
71.  See Nowlin, supra note 49, at 1086–96 (documenting the adverse environmental 
and public health effects from industrial hog production).  
72.  See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738 (stating that “[a]s envisioned, RTFs are 
intended to preserve open space and protect traditional rural life from urban 
encroachment,” but currently are used to “protect land users who themselves have 
contributed to a decline in the quality of rural living”). 
73.  See, e.g., Centner, supra note 16, at 11 (suggesting the implementation of size 
limitations for facilities that may qualify for nuisance protection or requirements to 
comply with best practices for odor and nutrient management); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-
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letter, the Kentucky attorney general addressed whether industrial 
hog facilities could be operated in a “reasonable and prudent” 
manner so as to gain protection under Kentucky’s RTF law.74 In 
considering whether such facilities should be protected under the 
statute, he noted the experience of industrial hog farming in North 
Carolina gave reason for pause:  
The experience of North Carolina persuades us that the 
practice of industrial-scale hog farming is neither reasonable 
nor prudent. In our state, an agricultural disaster is one that 
strikes the agricultural community, usually from acts of nature. 
In North Carolina, an agricultural disaster has come to signify a 
disaster that strikes the community at large from acts of an 
agricultural producer. We do not believe that any industrial 
process that, intentionally or not, dumps tons of animal waste 
into rivers and streams can be called reasonable or prudent.75 
Reaching this conclusion in 1997, the attorney general drew heavily 
on the catastrophic 1995 hog waste spill in North Carolina, where a 
storage lagoon ruptured at Oceanview Farms, dumping nearly 
twenty-five million gallons of hog waste into the New River.76 He 
further noted the water pollution caused by waste leaching from the 
lagoons as well as the airborne pollution associated with hog 
production at these facilities.77  
 The attorney general offered textual support for his decision 
based on the stated purpose of the Kentucky RTF law “to conserve, 
protect, and encourage the development and improvement of its 
agricultural land.”78 Drawing from this statement of purpose, which is 
strikingly similar to that of the North Carolina’s RTF law,79 he argued 
 
to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural 
Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103, 111–12 (1998) (describing the 
emergence of a “new attitude” towards industrialized swine production); Burns, supra 
note 41, at 881. 
74.  Op. Att’y Gen. Ky., No. 97-31, at 8–9 (Aug. 21, 1997), http://ag.ky.gov/civil/civil-
enviro/opinions/Pages/1997.aspx [https://perma.cc/HX73-Q2B5]. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 7–8; see Michael A. Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on 
Rivers and Estuaries, 88 AM. SCIENTIST 2, 6 (2000).  
77.  Op. Att'y Gen. Ky., supra note 74, at 8.  
78.  Id. at 5 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §	413.072(1) (West 2015)).  
79.  Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §	413.072(1) (West 2015) (“It is the declared 
policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, protect, and encourage the development and 
improvement of its agricultural land and silvicultural land for the production of food, 
timber, and other agricultural and silvicultural products.”), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-
700 (2015) (“It is the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and encourage 
the development and improvement of its agricultural land and forestland for the 
production of food, fiber, and other products.”).  
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that extending protections to such facilities would run contrary to the 
stated intent of the RTF law.80 In rejecting a broader interpretation of 
the statute, he noted that “[i]t is the cultivation and management of 
our land for agricultural operations that the legislature sought to 
protect, not the laboratories of science or the concrete buildings of 
manufacturing industries.”81 
 While some states have enacted reforms or adopted statutory 
interpretations to limit the application of these protections to 
CAFOs,82 other states, such as North Carolina, have extended 
protections for such facilities either under the RTF statutes or by 
other means.83 Reviewing the development of nuisance law in North 
Carolina and interpretations of the RTF law prior to its amendment 
in 2013 will help place the protections afforded to CAFOs in context. 
II.  NORTH CAROLINA’S RTF ACT 
 The origins of North Carolina’s RTF law lie in the historical 
development of common law nuisance and its application to 
agricultural facilities. Tracing the development and interpretation of 
nuisance law in North Carolina provides valuable context in which to 
assess the statutory protections provided under the state’s amended 
RTF law. This Section will provide a discussion of the development of 
nuisance law in North Carolina and the statutory protections 
provided under the state’s original RTF law. 
A. Development and Interpretation of Nuisance Law in North 
Carolina 
Nuisance law has its historical roots in English common law.84 
William Aldred’s Case85 represents one of the landmark cases in 
nuisance law. Establishing the common law principle of sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas, William Aldred’s Case recognized that the use 
of one’s property should be limited so as not to injure that of 
another.86 In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the social utility of 
 
80.  Ky. Att’y Gen., supra note 74, at 6–7.  
81.  Id.  
82.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §	561.19 (West 2015) (limiting the application of the 
RTF to facilities with a capacity of less than 1,000 swine or 2,500 head of cattle).  
83.  See infra notes 191–202 and accompanying text.  
84.  See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 765–71 (discussing the evolution of early private 
nuisance law in the common law).  
85.  (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821; 9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b–59 a.  
86.  Id. See Coquillette, supra note 4, at 776–81 (discussing the holding in Aldred’s 
Case and the underlying principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). 
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hog farming permitted such interference, the court in William 
Aldred’s Case noted:  
[T]he building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be 
built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof 
enters into the house, so that none can dwell there, an action 
lies for it. So if a man has a watercourse running in a ditch from 
the river to his house, for his necessary use; if a glover sets up a 
lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins so near the said 
watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has corrupted it, 
for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on 
the case lies for it	.	.	. and this stands with the rule of law and 
reason,	.	.	. sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.87 
This concept has served as the guiding principle for the development 
of nuisance law in the United States, including North Carolina.88  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined a private 
nuisance as “any substantial non-trespassory invasion of another’s 
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of 
liability forming conduct.”89 The intentional or unintentional creation 
of an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the plaintiff’s 
property may give rise to an actionable claim.90 North Carolina courts 
have identified two types of private nuisances: nuisance per se (or at 
law) and nuisance per accidens (or in fact).91 Nuisance per se is an act, 
occupation, or building that constitutes a nuisance under any 
 
87.  Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821; 9 Co. Rep. at 58 b–59 a; see Coquillette, supra 
note 4, at 776.  
88.  See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953) 
(“The law of private nuisance rests on the concept embodied in the ancient legal maxim 
[s]ic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning, in essence, that every person should so use 
his own property as not to injure that of another.”). 
89.  Id.; see NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30 (3d ed. 2015); 4 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	821D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A private nuisance 
is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of 
land.”). 
90.  Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 616, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813 (1962) (“A person 
is subject to liability for an intentional non-trespassory invasion of an interest in the use 
and enjoyment of land when his conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances of the 
particular case; a person is subject to liability for an unintentional invasion when his 
conduct is negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.”); Whiteside Estates, Inc. v. Highlands 
Cove, LLC, 146 N.C. App. 449, 455, 553 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2001) (citing Watts, 256 N.C. at 
617, 124 S.E.2d at 813); NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30 (3d ed. 2015). The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has defined intentional nuisance within this context to 
mean “when the person whose conduct is in question as a basis for liability acts for the 
purpose of causing it, or knows that it is resulting from his conduct, or knows that it is 
substantially certain to result from his conduct.” Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689. 
91.  Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687; see NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 
§	25.30 (3d ed. 2015). 
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circumstances.92 While the lawful operation of an enterprise does not 
constitute a nuisance per se,93 it may still be considered nuisance per 
accidens “by reason of [its] location, or by reason of the manner in 
which [it is] constructed, maintained, or operated.”94 However, not all 
intentional invasions of the use or enjoyment of another’s property 
constitute a private nuisance.95  
In order to establish a prima facie case for an intentional private 
nuisance, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant’s use 
of the property, under the circumstances, constituted an unreasonable 
invasion or interference with the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment of his 
property and (2) the plaintiff suffered substantial harm or injury as a 
result.96 A person may be found liable for creating or maintaining a 
private nuisance “regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised by 
him to avoid such injury.”97 The determination of reasonableness is a 
question of fact that is made from the perspective of an objectively 
 
92.  Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687 (“A nuisance per se or at law is an act, 
occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, 
regardless of location or surroundings.”). Traditional examples of a nuisance per se 
include operating a brothel or a gambling parlor. E.g., Tedeseki v. Berger, 43 So. 960, 961 
(Ala. 1907) (prostitution); Ehrlick v. Kentucky, 102 S.W. 289, 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907) 
(gambling); Givens v. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149, 156 (1885) (prostitution); 
Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 85 Pa. Super. 316, 318 (1925) (gambling). A plaintiff bringing 
a nuisance action against an agricultural facility under this theory would have to meet a 
difficult burden of establishing that the activity in question constitutes a nuisance at all 
times and under any circumstances. See Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“Indiana has determined that the raising of hogs is not a nuisance 
per se.”); Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329-GKF-PJC, 2010 WL 653032, at 
*5 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 17, 2010) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss claim under the 
theory of nuisance per se, holding that the state failed to establish that the defendant’s 
land application of poultry litter constituted a nuisance at all times). 
93.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 813. 
94.  See Morgan, 238 N.C. at 191, 77 S.E.2d at 687. 
95.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §	826 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); e.g., Ewen v. Maccherone, 927 N.Y.S.2d 274, 
278 (N.Y. App. Term 2011) (declining to find that secondhand smoke from neighbor who 
smoked in own house constituted a nuisance). 
96.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814; Elliott v. Muehlbach, 173 N.C. App. 
709, 712, 620 S.E.2d 266, 269 (2005) (citing Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814); see 
NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30 (3d ed. 2015). The plaintiff must also have a 
sufficient property interest to maintain a nuisance action. Kent v. Humphries, 303 N.C. 
675, 678–79, 281 S.E.2d 43, 45–46 (1981) (holding that a plaintiff who had entered into an 
invalid lease and tendered rent which was accepted by the landlord had sufficient property 
interest in the rented property to maintain a nuisance action). 
97.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 616, 124 S.E.2d at 813; Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 
689; Parker v. Barefoot, 130 N.C. App. 18, 21, 502 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1998) (“[A] defendant's 
use of state-of-the-art technology in the operation of a facility or the fact that he was not 
negligent in the design or construction of that facility are not defenses to a nuisance 
claim.”), rev’d, on other grounds, 351 N.C. 40, 519 S.E.2d 315 (1999).  
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reasonable person.98 The fact finder must consider all of the 
circumstances of a particular case and no single factor is 
determinative.99 Furthermore, the alleged injury must be considered 
substantial and “affect the health, comfort or property of those who 
live near	.	.	.	.	[by causing] some substantial annoyance, some material 
physical discomfort, or injury to their health or property.”100 
In contrast to a private nuisance, a public nuisance constitutes an 
interference or invasion of rights common to the public, affecting the 
local community rather than the private use or enjoyment of one’s 
property.101 A plaintiff may pursue an action for a public nuisance 
 
98.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
(FIRST), §	826 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 
§	826 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has expounded 
upon this inquiry:  
Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in each case by weighing the 
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the conduct of the 
defendant. Determination of the gravity of the harm involves consideration of the 
extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the social value which the law 
attaches to the type of use which is invaded, the suitability of the locality for that 
use, the burden on plaintiff to minimize the harm, and other relevant 
considerations arising upon the evidence. 
Rainey v. St. Lawrence Homes, Inc., 174 N.C. App. 611, 613, 621 S.E.2d 217, 220 (2005) 
(quoting Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977)).  
99.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 618, 124 S.E.2d at 814 (noting broad range of relevant factors 
and stating that “[n]o single factor is decisive; all the circumstances in the particular case 
must be considered”). Note that while the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Watts 
employed the term “conduct” as noted above, the proper focus arguably remains on the 
nature of the invasion itself rather than the defendant’s conduct. See NORTH CAROLINA 
LAW OF TORTS §	25.30[1] (3d ed. 2015) (citing Morgan, 238 N.C. at 194, 77 S.E.2d at 689; 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §	87–88 (5th ed. 1984)). 
100.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 617, 124 S.E.2d at 813–14 (quoting Pake v. Morris, 230 N.C. 
424, 426, 53 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1949)). Substantial injury must go beyond a “slight 
inconvenience	or petty annoyance.” Id. at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 815. However, “if one makes 
an unreasonable use of his property and thereby causes another substantial harm in the 
use and enjoyment of his, the former is liable for the injury inflicted.” Id. at 619, 124 
S.E.2d at 815 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, §	822 cmt. g, j (AM. LAW INST. 
1939). 
101.  State v. Everhardt, 203 N.C. 610, 618, 166 S.E. 738, 742 (1932). The Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has defined public nuisance in the following manner: 
“To constitute a public nuisance, the condition of things must be such as 
injuriously affects the community at large, and not merely one or even a very few 
individuals.	.	.	. Whatever tends to endanger life, or generate disease, and affect the 
health of the community; whatever shocks the public morals and sense of decency; 
whatever	shocks the religious feelings of the community, or tends to its 
discomfort—is generally, at common law, a public nuisance, and a crime.”  
Id. at 618, 166 S.E. at 742 (quoting WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 398, 399 (William E. Mikell ed., 3d ed. 1915)). See NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF 
TORTS §	25.40 (3d ed. 2015).  
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only if he can establish special damages “differing in kind and degree 
from that suffered in common with the general public.”102 
Under a nuisance claim, a party may seek a remedy of temporary 
or permanent damages, as well as injunctive relief.103 A temporary 
nuisance claim provides for damages solely related to past harm.104 
Alternatively, a permanent nuisance claim seeks damages for past, 
present, and future damages.105 In addition, a party may seek 
abatement of an ongoing nuisance by injunction. Within the context 
of a private intentional nuisance, “[t]he degree of unreasonableness 
of the defendants’ conduct determines whether damages or 
permanent injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy.”106 A court 
will only award injunctive relief in cases where the defendant’s 
conduct is found to be unreasonable based upon a finding that the 
gravity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility to the 
defendant.107 However, a court may still award damages even if it 
does not order injunctive relief.108  
Dating back to the time of William Aldred’s Case, the application 
of nuisance law to agricultural facilities raises critical questions about 
how to balance the right to enjoy one’s property with the social utility 
 
102.  Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 116, 574 
S.E.2d 48, 53 (2002) (holding that riparian waterfront owners and riverkeeper associations 
failed to establish special damages in public nuisance suit against hog producers, as 
“aesthetic and recreational interests alone” are insufficient to confer standing); Hampton 
v. N.C. Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 543–44, 27 S.E.2d 538, 543–44 (1943) (“[N]o individual may 
recover damages because of injury by public nuisance, unless he has received a special 
damage or unless the creator of the nuisance has thereby invaded some right which, upon 
principles of justice and public policy, cannot be considered merged in the general public 
right	.	.	.	.”); McManus v. S. R. Co., 150 N.C. 537, 540, 64 S.E. 766, 768 (1909). 
103.  See NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015). 
104.  See id. 
105.  See Broadbent v. Allison, 176 N.C. App. 359, 370, 626 S.E.2d 758, 766 (2006) 
(citing Phillips v. Chesson, 231 N.C. 566, 570, 58 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1950)) (“When 
permanent damages have been awarded, defendants have in effect been granted an 
easement to continue operations on their property in the same manner as previously 
conducted.”); NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015). The award 
of permanent damages for a nuisance action will preclude any future recovery for a 
plaintiff based on the alleged nuisance in question. Broadbent, 176 N.C. App. at 370, 626 
S.E.2d at 766.  
106.  Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 200, 334 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1985) (citing 
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977)); NORTH CAROLINA 
LAW OF TORTS §	25.30[1][a] (3d ed. 2015). 
107.  Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 200, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (citing Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 
N.C. 201, 217, 236 S.E.2d 787, 797 (1977))(discussing the relevant test for determining 
whether injunctive relief is called for in the context of an agricultural nuisance suit against 
a neighboring hog farm). 
108.  Id. 
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of agricultural production.109 North Carolina courts have recognized 
actionable claims under both theories of public and private nuisance 
resulting from interferences such as noise,110 smoke,111 and odors.112 
Accordingly, the operation of an agricultural facility can give rise to 
an actionable nuisance claim.113  
The spread of urban and residential development into 
traditionally agricultural communities poses unique challenges under 
common law nuisance, and raises concerns about the protection of 
existing farmland and agricultural facilities.114 The extension of urban 
development into agricultural communities implicates the common 
law doctrine of “coming to the nuisance.”115 This doctrine applies in 
cases where a plaintiff acquires or improves his land after the creation 
of the alleged nuisance.116 Under common law, a plaintiff is not 
automatically precluded from recovery by voluntarily “coming to the 
 
109.  The court in William Aldred’s Case succinctly laid out the underlying conflict 
between these two conflicting equities, contrasting the defendant’s claim of social utility 
that “the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man” with the 
right of enjoyment to one’s property. William Aldred’s Case (1611), 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817; 
9 Co. Rep. 57 b, 58 b; see Coquillette, supra note 4, at 775–77 (discussing the court’s 
treatment of the defendant’s argument based on social utility). 
110.  See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196, 197–98 
(4th Cir. 1952) (holding that noise and vibrations associated with the operation of a gas 
compressor station constituted a public nuisance under Maryland law); Jones v. Queen 
City Speedways, Inc., 276 N.C. 231, 242–43, 172 S.E.2d 42, 50 (1970) (holding that noise 
from drag strip racing constituted a private nuisance); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 
611, 618, 124 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1962) (holding that noise and vibrations from neighboring 
hosiery facility constituted an actionable nuisance); Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 51, 
55 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1949) (recognizing plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief from airport 
noise). 
111.  See, e.g., Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 335 
(1883) (affirming a church’s recovery of damages for a nuisance created by a railway 
facility’s noise, smoke, and odors); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 194–95, 77 
S.E.2d 682, 690 (1953) (recognizing actionable nuisance claim for neighboring landowners 
against oil refinery due to gases and odors emitted from the facility).  
112.  See, e.g., Oates v. Algodon Mfg. Co., 217 N.C. 488, 489, 8 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1940) 
(recognizing damages for “any inconvenience and annoyance by way of odors suffered by 
him to his land”); King v. Ward, 207 N.C. 782, 783–84, 178 S.E. 577, 578–79 (1935) 
(affirming damages for loss of enjoyment caused by odors); Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 199, 
334 S.E.2d at 490 (recognizing actionable nuisance claim based on odor from neighboring 
hog farm).  
113.  See, e.g., Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 199, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (discussing the operation 
of a hog farm as a nuisance). 
114.  See generally Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 108–10 (discussing the early 
application of the coming to the nuisance defense in this context).  
115.  See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co. 494 P.2d 701, 708 (Ariz. 
1972) (describing nuisance action brought by a residential developer against a large cattle 
feedlot in a traditionally agricultural community).  
116.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	840D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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nuisance.”117 However, the priority of use is only one of many factors 
that must be taken into account in determining whether the 
defendant’s use of the property is unreasonable.118 Courts have 
traditionally protected agricultural operations in rural areas when the 
neighbor bringing the suit “came to the nuisance.”119 Nevertheless, 
each court retains discretion to determine the relative weight of this 
factor on a case-by-case basis.120 For this reason, many states, 
including North Carolina, have provided statutory protections to 
further insulate agricultural facilities from nuisance suits. 
B. Enactment of the 1979 RTF Act in North Carolina 
In response to concerns over the loss of farmland and 
agricultural development, states enacted “right-to-farm” laws to 
better protect agricultural operations from urban development. All 
fifty states currently have RTF laws;121 the large majority of which 
were first enacted between 1978 and 1983.122 RTF laws generally 
protect either agricultural operations from nuisance actions or 
prevent zoning and other restrictive local regulations from limiting 
agricultural activities.123  
In 1979, the North Carolina legislature enacted one of the first 
and most influential RTF laws in the country.124 The statute’s 
 
117.  Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 618–19, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962). See 
generally NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS §	25.30 (3d ed. 2015) (supporting this 
approach). The Second Restatement notes that “[o]therwise the defendant by setting up 
an activity or a condition that results in the nuisance could condemn all the land in his 
vicinity to a servitude without paying any compensation, and so could arrogate to himself 
a good deal of the value of the adjoining land.” Id. §	840D cmt. b. 
118.  Watts, 256 N.C. at 619, 124 S.E.2d at 815. 
119.  See, e.g., Arbor Theatre Corp. v. Campbell Soup Co., 296 N.E.2d 11, 13–14 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1973); Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 331 P.2d 539, 548 (Kan. 1958). But see Pendoley 
v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Mass. 1963) (affirming actionable nuisance claim for 
residential community against preexisting hog farm). See generally Grossman & Fischer, 
supra note 11, at 108–11 (discussing the early application of the coming to the nuisance 
defense in this context). Spur Industries v. Del Webb provides a novel application of the 
coming to the nuisance defense within this context, recognizing a cognizable nuisance 
claim by a residential developer against a livestock facility, but requiring the developer to 
indemnify for the livestock owner for the costs of either moving or shutting down his 
facility. 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
120.  See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 108–10. 
121.  Harrison M. Pittman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-Farm 
Acts, in 8 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS 465, 480 (6th ed. 2005); Hamilton, supra note 73, at 
103; see Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707. 
122.  Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707. 
123.  See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 104. 
124.  Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 119; see Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 202, 
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 140, 140–41 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	106-700–01 
(2015)); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws, in 13 NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL 
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“declaration of policy,” which has remained largely unchanged since 
its enactment, clearly states the law’s purpose.125 In order to further 
“the declared policy of the State to conserve and protect and 
encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural 
land[,]” the Act has the stated purpose of “reduc[ing] the loss to the 
State of its agricultural and forestry resources by limiting the 
circumstances under which an agricultural or forestry operation may 
be deemed to be a nuisance.”126 In essence, the law enables 
defendants to assert a “coming to the nuisance” defense for 
preexisting agricultural operations in lawsuits brought by plaintiffs 
using neighboring properties for non-agricultural uses.127  
As enacted, the statute provides an affirmative defense to 
nuisance liability128 for preexisting agricultural and forestry 
operations.129 An agricultural or forestry operation may raise this 
defense in a private or public nuisance action provided that: (1) the 
 
LAW §	124.02 n.7 (2015); Reinert, supra note 16, at 1707 (noting original portion of the 
North Carolina RTF statute is generally considered the model “traditional” statute among 
states). At least nineteen states have patterned operative language on the original North 
Carolina statute, though some state statutes may still vary significantly. Grossman & 
Fischer, supra note 11, at 119–20. 
125.  See Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, §	106-700, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441, 441–
43 (codified as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015)).  
126.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015).  
127.  See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 118. 
128.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(f)(2) (2015) (describing statutory protections as 
an “affirmative defense”); Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 253, 451 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1994) 
(noting the defendant set forth the North Carolina RTF as an affirmative defense); 
Answer to Amended Complaint at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-000185-
BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF no. 43 (listing the RTF act as an affirmative defense to 
liability). When interpreting similar RTF statutes, courts in other jurisdictions have found 
that because a state RTF provides an affirmative defense, the burden is on the proponent 
of the defense to prove the facts required to support it. See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 
N.E.2d 850, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the defendant had burden to prove 
RTF defense, but the plaintiff had burden of proof for the exception for negligent 
operation under the Indiana RTF law); Lima Twp. v. Bateson, 838 N.W.2d 898, 906 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2013) (holding the defendant raising the defense has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence that the challenged conduct is protected under the 
Michigan RTF act). 
129.  Under the statute, “agricultural operation” was defined as “includ[ing], without 
limitation, any facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, 
poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(b) (2011). As 
amended, the statute also provides protections for “forestry operation[s],” which are 
defined as “those activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.” 
Id. §	701(b1); Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, §	106-700, 701(b1), 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 
441, 441–42 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT §	106-700, 701(b1) (2015)); Act of 
July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(b1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 (codified as 
amended at	N.C. GEN. STAT.	§	106-701 (b1) (2015)) (removing the phrase “but not 
sawmill operations” from §	106-701(b1)). 
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facility has been in operation for over one year and (2) the operation 
was not initially a nuisance.130 The defendant has the burden of proof 
in raising this defense.131 However, the statute contains an exception 
that allows plaintiffs to recover damages when an operation causes 
water pollution or an overflow of water onto the plaintiff’s 
property.132  
Even before the enactment of the 2013 amendments, North 
Carolina’s RTF law offered agricultural operations broad protections 
from nuisance liability. The law exempted all types of preexisting 
agricultural activities from nuisance liability regardless of their nature 
or size, provided that the required statutory elements are met.133 This 
type of general exemption represented one of the broadest right-to-
farm protections available and has been adopted in at least fifteen 
other states.134 In addition, the 1979 law further limited the regulation 
of such facilities through local zoning regulations, pre-empting all 
local ordinances that “would make the operation of any such 
agricultural or forestry operation or its appurtenances a nuisance 
or	.	.	.	abatement thereof as a nuisance.”135 These broad protections 
 
130.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2015) (“No agricultural or forestry operation or 
any of its appurtenances shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed 
conditions in or about the locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in 
operation for more than one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the 
operation began.”).  
131.  See Price v. Conley, 21 N.C. App. 326, 328, 204 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1974) (holding 
that the burden of proof generally lies with the party raising an affirmative defense). 
However, a plaintiff may have the burden of demonstrating that the nuisance results from 
negligent operation of the facility to preclude the defendant from raising this defense. See 
infra notes 215–217 and accompanying text. 
132.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(c) (2015) (“The provisions of subsection (a) 
shall not affect or defeat the right of any person, firm, or corporation to recover damages 
for any injuries or damages sustained by him on account of any pollution of, or change in 
condition of, the waters of any stream or on the account of any overflow of lands of any 
such person, firm, or corporation.”); Hamilton, supra note 73, §	124.02[2][g] (discussing the 
prevalence of such provisions in nuisance-related RTF laws). 
133.  See §	106-701(a)–(b); Hamilton, supra note 73, §	124.02[2] (describing the scope 
of these general exemptions within RTF acts from other states). 
134.  The following states have adopted similar general exemptions: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington. Hamilton, supra note 
73, §	124.02[2]. Other states have incorporated other types of exemptions, including those 
related to livestock or agricultural facilities. See generally id. §	124.02[2] (noting a variety 
of possible exemptions). 
135.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(d) (2015). See Hamilton, supra note 73, §	124.02[2]. 
Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia have 
enacted either identical or similar provisions in their right-to-farm laws. Id. Note that as a 
result of the 1997 Amendments, a county may adopt limited zoning regulations for large 
swine facilities of approximately 4,000 hogs or more. Aaron M. McKown, Note, Hog 
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provided neighboring communities with limited measures for 
regulating operation of these facilities.  
While the breadth of the protections afforded to agricultural 
facilities under the law has been widely criticized,136 the underlying 
justifications for the RTF law are not without merit. The promotion 
of agriculture and preservation of farmland not only protects a vital 
sector of North Carolina’s economy,137 but may also prevent urban 
sprawl and promote a healthy environment.138 The loss of farms and 
farmland remains a serious issue in North Carolina. Between 2002 
and 2012, North Carolina lost over 650,000 acres of farmland and 
thousands of farms.139 As a result of the industrialization of farming 
practices across the nation, only two percent of Americans are 
directly involved in agricultural production today.140 These changes in 
both the physical and social landscape of the countryside have placed 
agricultural practices under much greater scrutiny.141  
In the face of the changing landscape of rural North Carolina, the 
protections in place under the RTF law arguably have the potential to 
help farmers avoid costly litigation and efficiently resolve conflicts 
between neighboring landowners.142 Given the capital investment 
required for farming operations, the litigation of a nuisance dispute 
may threaten the continued viability of a farming operation.143 
Conversely, farmers may be less sensitive to the impacts of their 
operations on surrounding communities due to the perceived 
 
Farms and Nuisance Law in Parker v. Barefoot: Has North Carolina Become a Hog 
Heaven and Waste Lagoon?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2355, 2367 & n.94 (1999) (citing N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §	153A-340(b)(3) (1997)) (discussing the 1997 amendment and the 4,000 hog 
approximation based on 600,000 pound steady live weight limit provided in statute). 
136.  See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738. 
137.  “North Carolina’s agricultural industry contributes	.	.	.	$78 billion to the state’s 
economy, accounts for more than 17 percent of the state’s income, and employs 16 percent 
of the workforce.” North Carolina Agriculture Overview, N.C. DEP’T AGRIC. & 
CONSUMER SERVS., http://www.ncagr.gov/stats/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc
/24XB-PXR5].  
138.  See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 100. 
139.  North Carolina Continues to Lose Farms, but Rate of Land Loss Slows, 
SOUTHEAST FARM PRESS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://southeastfarmpress.com/miscellaneous
/north-carolina-continues-lose-farms-rate-land-loss-slows [https://perma.cc/P4L8-8EN8]. 
140.  Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When do Right-
To-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006). 
141.  See id. at 91–93 (discussing the change in the political landscape and resulting 
scrutiny on agricultural practices in the United States). 
142.  See Jacqui Fatka, What Right-to-Farm Laws do for Farmers, FARM FUTURES 
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://farmfutures.com/story-right-farm-laws-farmers-17-125832-spx_1 
[https://perma.cc/T2CV-HB3N]. 
143.  See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 11, at 100 (discussing relevant factors in a 
farmer’s decision to continue farming on a particular piece of land). 
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protections afforded to agricultural operations under RTF laws.144 
For this reason, commentators have criticized RTF laws as being 
overly protective of agricultural facilities to the detriment of the 
surrounding communities.145 The following review of the existing case 
law regarding North Carolina’s RTF law prior to the 2013 
amendments will provide insight into these concerns and the potential 
implications of the newly amended law. 
C. Judicial Interpretation of the 1979 RTF Act 
Following the enactment of the RTF law in 1979, the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals has recognized certain limitations on the 
availability of statutory protections under the RTF law consistent 
with the doctrine of “coming to the nuisance.” While acknowledging 
“[i]t is the public policy of North Carolina to encourage farming, 
farmers, and farmlands,”146 the court of appeals has interpreted the 
original RTF law to provide an affirmative defense only in cases 
where the agricultural operation preceded the plaintiff’s non-
agricultural use147 and the character of the operation did not undergo 
a fundamental change.148 As interpreted by the courts, these 
limitations helped to preserve equitable relief for plaintiffs who did 
not fall within intended scope of the law.149 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute 
to provide a codification of the “coming to the nuisance” defense, 
limiting the availability of its protections to preexisting agricultural 
operations. In Mayes v. Tabor,150 a private summer camp brought a 
nuisance suit against a neighboring hog farm. The summer camp had 
been in operation for over sixty years and its current owners preceded 
the operation of the hog farm.151 The defendant had been operating 
the hog farm for well over one year prior to the commencement of 
 
144.  Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at 298–99; id. at 100–01. 
145.  See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738. 
146.  Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 253, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994) (citing 
Baucom's Nursery Co. v. Mecklenburg Cty., 62 N.C. App. 396, 398, 303 S.E.2d 236, 238 
(1983)); Baucom’s Nursery Co. 62 N.C. App. at 398, 303 S.E.2d at 238 (citing N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§	106-550, 139-2, 700, 583 (1983)). 
147.  See Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985). 
148.  See Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254–55, 451 S.E.2d at 3–4. 
149.  See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
150.  77 N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985).  
151.  Id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 489. The summer camp had been in operation for 
approximately sixty years. The plaintiffs purchased the summer camp nineteen years 
before the commencement of trial. The defendant bought the property fifteen years prior 
to the action and began raising 300–500 hogs on the property. Id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490. 
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the nuisance action152 and moved for summary judgment on the basis 
that the nuisance action was barred under the RTF Act.153  
In affirming the trial court’s denial of summary judgment for the 
defendant, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the 
plaintiff was not precluded from bringing a nuisance action due to any 
“	‘changed circumstances in or about the locality’ as this phrase is 
intended by the statute.”154 Noting that “[t]his is not a case in which 
the non-agricultural use extended into an agricultural area,” the court 
implicitly rejected the view that the one-year requirement within the 
statute should be read as a statute of repose defining a limited time 
period in which a nuisance suit may be brought.155 Consistent with the 
interpretation of similar RTF statutes in other states,156 the court 
interpreted the statute to condition the affirmative defense on a 
finding that the defendant’s operation preceded the plaintiff’s non-
agricultural use.157 
 Similarly, agricultural operations that underwent a “fundamental 
change” received only limited protections under the 1979 law.158 In 
Durham v. Britt,159 a residential developer purchased property 
 
152.  See id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (noting the defendant purchased his property 
fifteen years prior to the commencement of the action and began raising hogs there); 
Statement of the Evidence at 27, Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985) 
(No. 8429SC1230) (noting the defendant operated a hog farm for at least ten years) (on 
file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
153.  Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490.  
154.  Id. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (1983)).  
155.  Id. In Mayes, the defendant was operating a hog farm for well over one year 
prior to the commencement of the nuisance action. See id. at 198, 334 S.E.2d at 490 (noting 
the defendant purchased his property fifteen years prior to the commencement of the 
action and began raising hogs there); Statement of the Evidence at 27, Mayes v. Tabor, 77 
N.C. App. 197, 334 S.E.2d 489 (1985) (No. 8429SC1230) (noting the defendant operated a 
hog farm for at least ten years). 
156.  See Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 579 (Ga. 1981); Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 
1352, 1355 (Idaho 1995); Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990). But see Steffens v. Keeler, 503 N.W.2d 675, 677–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that even though plaintiff first inhabited neighboring property, the defendant’s hog farm 
not subject to private nuisance suit because the farm was operated in conformity with 
generally accepted agricultural practices, and the use of area within one mile radius of 
defendant’s property had not sufficiently changed before defendants started hog 
operation); Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37–38 (Tex. 2003) (holding that 
one-year limitation in Texas RTF law represented a statute of repose, providing absolute 
immunity to a non-negligent agricultural operation that had been in operation for over a 
year).  
157.  Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (“This is not a case in which the 
non-agricultural use extended into an agricultural area. Camp Deerwoode has been in 
existence for sixty years.”). 
158.  Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254–55, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1994). 
159.  117 N.C. App. 250, 451 S.E.2d 1 (1994). 
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located next to an existing turkey farm that had operated for several 
years.160 Following the plaintiff’s purchase of the property, the 
neighboring farm owner sought to convert his operation into an 
industrial hog facility.161 The plaintiff brought a nuisance action 
against the property owner prior to the commencement of the hog 
farming operation and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that the nuisance claim is barred 
under the RTF law.162  
 In reversing the trial court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
stated “we do not believe the legislature intended [the North Carolina 
RTF statute] to cover situations in which a party fundamentally 
changes the nature of the agricultural activity which had theretofore 
been covered under the statute.”163 While noting that “a fundamental 
change could consist of a significant change in the type of agricultural 
operation, or a significant change in the hours of the agricultural 
operation,”164 the court held that “[c]ertainly, in the instant case, a 
fundamental change has occurred where defendant, who previously 
operated turkey houses, has decided to change his farming operation 
to that of a hog production facility.”165 The Durham court reasoned 
that the “plaintiff did not ‘come to the nuisance,’ but rather, 
defendant Britt ‘imposed the nuisance upon plaintiff’ because ‘no 
nuisance existed until defendant Britt fundamentally changed the 
nature of the agricultural activity occurring on his property by 
constructing a high volume commercial swine facility.’	”166 
Contrasting the operation of “turkey houses” with that of a “hog 
production facility,” the Durham court drew a distinction between the 
 
160.  Id. at 251, 451 S.E.2d at 1. The defendant operated four turkey houses at the 
time of the trial. Id. 
161.  Id. at 251, 451 S.E.2d at 1–2. 
162.  Id. at 252–53, 451 S.E.2d at 2. 
163.  Id. at 254–55, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (emphasis added). 
164.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing IND. CODE. §	34-1-52-4 (1986)) (comparing the 
North Carolina RTF statute to Indiana RTF statute). 
165.  Id. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 4. While not expressly clarified by the Durham court, 
the finding of a “fundamental change” would most likely result in the resetting of the one-
year statute of repose within the statute. See Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 
100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting a similar Indiana RTF statute and explaining 
the effect of finding of a significant change).  
166.  Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting 
plaintiff’s brief). The alternative, as alluded to in the opinion, would be that after 
“conduct[ing] an agricultural operation on his property for a period in excess of one year, 
thereafter [a person] may conduct any agricultural activity regardless of its scope and 
impact on surrounding neighbors, and the neighbors may not be heard to complain.” Id. 
(emphasis in original) (quoting plaintiff’s brief). 
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two types of farming operations.167 In this sense, the court’s exclusive 
use of the phrase “hog production facility” rather than “hog farm” is 
revealing because it distinguishes traditional farming practices from 
those of industrial agriculture.168 The limitations imposed by the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals advanced the argument that such 
facilities should not receive the same protection under the statute.169 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina declined to hear the appeal of 
the reversal.170 North Carolina’s treatment of such cases is consistent 
with other state courts, which have similarly found that a significant 
change in operation precludes the availability of an affirmative 
defense when interpreting comparable RTF laws.171  
In many ways, this interpretation of the statute resembles the 
balancing of equitable considerations in common law, helping to 
ensure that the application of nuisance immunity under the law does 
not overstep its intended purpose.172 However, the 2013 amendments 
to the RTF law severely curtail the prior statutory interpretation by 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, raising serious doubts about 
the equitable relief available to plaintiffs under these circumstances. 
 
167.  Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3; see Burns, supra note 41, at 881 
n.241. 
168.  Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3–4; see Burns, supra note 41, at 
881 n.241 (noting the court’s use of the term “hog production facility” in its opinion).  
169.  See Burns, supra note 41, at 881.  
170.  Durham v. Britt, 340 N.C. 260, 456 S.E.2d 828 (1995). 
171.  See Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Idaho 1995) (“The district court 
correctly concluded the RTFA does not wholly prevent a finding of nuisance in 
circumstances of an expanding agricultural operation surrounded by an area that has 
remained substantially unchanged.”); Jerome Twp. v. Melchi, 457 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a change from a strawberry farm to an apiary precluded a 
nuisance defense under the Michigan RTF act). In Payne v. Skaar, the Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed the district court’s holding that the expansion of a feedlot from 
approximately 1,000–2,500 head of cattle to 3,200–4,900 head of cattle constituted a 
significant change that precluded a defense under the RTF statute. Payne, 900 P.2d. at 
1353–54. The court emphasized the fact that the surrounding area remained substantially 
unchanged and some of the citizens involved in the suit predated the feedlot. Id. at 1355. 
On the other hand, some courts have held that an expansion or change in operation does 
not render the RTF act inapplicable. But see Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 
100, 102–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a change from grain farming to hog farming 
constituted a significant change, but an expansion of the hog facility from 29 hogs to 
between 200–300 hogs did not preclude a nuisance defense under the Indiana RTF law); 
Steffens v. Keeler, 503 N.W.2d 675, 677–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that pig farm 
could raise an affirmative defense under the Michigan RTF Act even when it did not 
precede the plaintiff landowner because there was insufficient evidence that the area 
surrounding the farm had changed to a predominantly residential area).  
172.  See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 170. 
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III.  ENACTMENT AND POTENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 2013 
AMENDMENTS TO THE NORTH CAROLINA RTF ACT 
Over fifteen years after Durham v. Britt, the North Carolina 
General Assembly significantly amended the RTF law to expand the 
scope of statutory protections afforded to agricultural and forestry 
operations from nuisance suits.173 The passage of this legislation is 
better understood if viewed in conjunction with growing number of 
agricultural nuisance suits being filed in North Carolina and several 
other states.174 As of this writing, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals has not yet had the opportunity to interpret the RTF law as 
amended. This Section will explore the underlying motivations behind 
the law—as well as potential statutory interpretations of the amended 
RTF law—by drawing from the interpretations of similar provisions 
in other states. 
A. Growing Trend in Agricultural Nuisance Suits and Legislative 
Proposals 
Despite the statutory protections from nuisance suits afforded to 
agricultural operations under RTF laws across the country, plaintiffs 
have brought successful nuisance actions against industrial 
agricultural facilities.175 Neighboring landowners have successfully 
halted the construction of industrial hog farms by obtaining 
injunctions under the theory of anticipatory nuisance.176 Plaintiffs 
have also won multiple high-profile nuisance lawsuits against 
industrial pork producers for the operation of existing facilities.177 In 
 
173.  See infra Section III.B. 
174.  See infra Section III.A. 
175.  See, e.g., Fatka, supra note 142 (noting recent nuisance suit in Indiana as well as 
other pending cases in California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania); Bridget Huber, Law and 
Odor: How to Take Down a Terrible-Smelling Hog Farm, MOTHER JONES (May 21, 2014 
5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/04/terrible-smell-hog-farms-
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/K3P5-338X].  
176.  See Superior Farm Mgmt. v. Montgomery, 513 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. 1999); 
Terence J. Centner, Agricultural Nuisances: Qualifying Legislative ‘‘Right-to-Farm’’ 
Protection Through Qualifying Management Practices, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 259, 261 
(2002). 
177.  See, e.g., Hanes v. Cont’l Grain Co., 58 S.W.3d 1, 2, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff’s temporary nuisance claim against hog 
producer and award of $100,000 to fifty-two of the plaintiffs); Huber, supra note 175 
(noting the success of two plaintiff’s lawyers in securing over $32 million in jury verdicts as 
well as millions of dollars in settlements for nuisance suits brought against hog producers); 
Mark Koba, $20 Million Fight Threatened Over Pig Smell on Farm, NBC NEWS (May 9, 
2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/20-million-fight-threatened
-over-pig-smell-farm-n101751 [https://perma.cc/WJ2W-8AHA] (noting that a $20 million 
lawsuit is threatened against pork producer). 
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2010, a jury awarded seven Missouri plaintiffs an $11 million 
judgment in a nuisance suit against Premium Standard Farms, Inc., a 
subsidiary of Smithfield Foods.178 After the jury verdict was 
announced, Premium Standard Farms threatened to leave the state.179  
 In 2013, hundreds of plaintiffs brought nuisance claims against 
hog producer Murphy-Brown, LLC, a subsidiary of Smithfield 
Foods,180 arising from Murphy-Brown’s operation of industrial hog 
facilities in North Carolina.181 As of this writing, there are currently 
twenty-six lawsuits related to these nuisance actions pending in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina.182 According to the complaints, many plaintiffs are 
longtime—if not lifelong—area residents,183 some of whom can trace 
back their family’s ownership of their current properties over a 
century or more.184 The complaints illustrate the plight of residents 
living near these facilities:  
Plaintiffs have suffered episodes of noxious and sickening odor, 
onslaughts of flies and pests, nausea, burning and watery eyes, 
 
178.  Owens v. ContiGroup Cos., 344 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mont. Ct. App. 2011) 
(affirming verdict and rejecting defendant’s claim that damages were excessive). See Ryan 
Davis, Mo. Looks to Rein in Farm Odor Nuisance Suits, LAW360, (Mar. 31, 2011, 8:06 PM) 
http://www.law360.com/articles/229224/mo-looks-to-rein-in-farm-odor-nuisance-suits [https://
perma.cc/GW3U-AXQK]. 
179.  Following the jury verdict, Premium Standard Farms issued a press release 
stating that “[i]n light of this decision and in view of the continuing hostile environment 
toward live hog production, we have serious concerns whether we will ever make any 
future investments in the state of Missouri.” Press Release, Premium Standard Farms, 
LLC, Premium Standard Farms to Appeal Missouri Verdict, BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 4, 
2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100304006726/en/Premium-Standard-
Farms-Appeal-Missouri-Verdict#.Uz78XmTrVkC [https://perma.cc/6WN7-KUNU]; see 
Davis, supra note 178. 
180.  See Michaels, supra note 27; NC Hog Farm Factory Litigation, WALLACE & 
GRAHAM, P.A., http://myhogfarmcase.com/ [https://perma.cc/6Y74-8AX3]. While 
nuisance claims were initially filed back in July of 2013, those claims were withdrawn and 
new claims were filed in 2014 under the direction of the law firm Wallace & Graham. See 
supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
181.  See supra note 26–32 and accompanying text.  
182.  NC Hog Farm Factory Litigation, supra note 180. 
183.  See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 7, 10, 12, 14, 17, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, 
No. 7:14-CV-00185-BR, (E.D.N.C. July 31, 2015) ECF No. 42 (noting plaintiff 
Annjeanette Gillis was a lifelong resident; plaintiff Gwendolyn Pickett was a lifelong 
resident; plaintiff Allen T. Johnson has lived there his whole life except for two years; 
plaintiff Elsie Darlene Maynor was a lifelong resident of the community, who has resided 
at her current residence for twenty-three years; and plaintiff William Murphy and his 
family have lived at their current residence for many years). 
184.  See, e.g., id. at 7. One of the plaintiffs, Annjeanette Gillis, is an African 
American woman who has lived on her family’s homestead since she was born in 1949. Id. 
The complaint notes that her family’s claim to the land dates back over a century to the 
Reconstruction era. Id. 
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stress, anger, worry, loss of property value, loss of use and 
enjoyment of their property, inability to comfortably engage in 
outdoor activities, cookouts, gardening, lawn chores, drifting of 
odorous mist and spray onto their land, inability to keep 
windows and doors open, difficulty breathing and numerous 
other harms.185 
The plaintiffs alleged private temporary nuisance186 and negligence 
claims,187 requesting both compensatory and punitive damages.188 The 
defendant, Murphy-Brown, LLC, raised the affirmative defense that 
the plaintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the RTF law. 
In support of its defense, Murphy-Brown alleged that “the farm[s] at 
issue began operations more than one year before Plaintiffs’ alleged 
causes of action arose and that operations at that farm were 
reasonable and not a nuisance at the time they began.”189 This 
ongoing nuisance litigation served as a catalyst for the 2013 
amendments to the North Carolina RTF law.190  
In response to the increasing number of agricultural nuisance 
lawsuits over the past two decades, many states, including North 
Carolina, have expanded protections for agricultural facilities from 
nuisance actions.191 Following the $11 million jury verdict for the 
plaintiffs in the case against Premium Standard Farms, the Missouri 
legislature passed a law prohibiting multiple lawsuits against the same 
farm under the theory of temporary nuisance and limiting the 
availability of damages in both temporary and permanent nuisance 
 
185.  Id. at 6. 
186.  Id. at 58–60. The Plaintiffs claim that their “right to use and enjoy their 
properties has been impaired by recurring foul and offensive odors; hog manure and urine; 
flies or other insects; buzzards or other scavenger animals; vectors of disease; trucks cause 
noise and lights at night and foul smells; dead hogs; and other sources of nuisance.” Id. at 
58. The complaint alleges that “[t]he nuisance caused by Defendant’s swine has 
substantially impaired Plaintiffs’ and [sic] use and enjoyment of their property, and has 
caused anger, embarrassment, discomfort, annoyance, inconvenience, decreased quality of 
life, deprivation of opportunity to continue to develop properties, injury to and diminished 
value of properties, physical and mental discomfort and reasonable fear of disease and 
adverse health effects.” Id.  
187.  Id. at 60–61.  
188.  Id. at 62. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant is vicariously liable for the 
actions of its contract growers in the state, and otherwise liable under an “integrator 
liability” theory. Id. at 50. 
189.  Defendant’s Answer at 51, Gillis v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-CV-00185-
BR (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2015), ECF No. 43. 
190.  See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text. 
191.  See Bennett, supra note 14. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016) 
2016] RIGHT TO FARM AND NUISANCE LAW 2127 
actions.192 Other states have even amended their state constitutions to 
incorporate a constitutional “right to farm.”193  
In addition, many states have strengthened protections for 
agricultural facilities through amendments to their RTF laws.194 In 
recognition of this trend, the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(“ALEC”), a conservative think tank, released its own model Right-
to-Farm Act in 1996.195 ALEC’s model RTF law provides extensive 
protections for agricultural operations from nuisance suits.196 The 
model bill broadly defines “agricultural operations” and significantly 
limits the circumstances under which changes at an agricultural 
facility would expose it to nuisance liability.197 In addition, the model 
 
192.  Brent Martin, Gov. Nixon Signs Farm Nuisance Lawsuit Bill, After Vetoing 
Initial Bill, MISSOURINET (May 11, 2011), http://www.missourinet.com/2011/05/11/gov-
nixon-signs-farm-nuisance-lawsuit-bill-after-vetoing-initial-bill-audio/ [https://perma.cc
/8WGV-8WDW]; Missouri Jury Awards Residents $11 Million in Damages from Living 
Under Cloud of Stench Caused by Industrial Hog Farms, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 5, 2010, 
1:58 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/missouri-jury-awards-residents-11-
million-in-damages-from-living-under-cloud-of-stench-caused-by-industrial-hog-farms-
86643287.html [https://perma.cc/QP8Y-KNPZ]; see MO. REV. STAT. §	537.296 (2015). 
193.  North Dakota and Missouri have both amended their state constitutions to 
include a right-to-farm, while Oklahoma and Indiana have unsuccessfully attempted to do 
so. See Ross H. Pifer, Right to Farm Statutes and the Changing State of Modern 
Agriculture, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707, 715–717 (discussing North Dakota 
Constitutional Amendment); Zboreak, supra note 36, at n.173 (discussing North Dakota 
and Missouri amendments and attempted constitutional amendment in Indiana); Brook 
Jarvis, A Constitutional Right to Industrial Farming?, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-09/industrial-farming-state-constitutional-
amendments-may-give-legal-shield [https://perma.cc/Z8UK-5UL7]. In 2012, North Dakota 
amended its constitution to provide constitutional protections for “the right of farmers and 
ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern livestock production, and ranching 
practices.” N.D. CONST. art. XI, §	29 (amended 2012). In 2014, Missouri successfully 
amended its constitution to incorporate a “right of farmers and ranchers to engage in 
farming and ranching practices[.]” MO. CONST. art. I, §	35 (amended 2014). These 
amendments have been sharply criticized as “a concerted effort to shield factory farms and 
concentrated agricultural feeding operations from regulations to protect livestock, 
consumers and the environment.” Vote ‘no’ on Missouri ‘Right to Farm’ Amendment in 
August, KANSAS CITY STAR (June 23 2014 4:43 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/
editorials/article603633.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/K9PU-HHYV]. 
194.  See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 577–78 (describing the extension of “right to 
farm” protection to facilities that met regulatory requirements); David Bennett, supra 
note 14 (explaining how several states have passed legislation to protect “modern farming 
rights”). 
195.  Right to Farm Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/model-
policy/right-to-farm-act/ [https://perma.cc/YJZ7-HCAC]. 
196.  Id. See generally Zboreak, supra note 36, at 171–76 (discussing ALEC’s model 
RTF legislation).  
197.  Right to Farm Act, supra note 195. In particular, the model bill states that: 
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bill contains a provision that allows an agricultural operation to 
recover attorneys’ fees from a plaintiff following an unsuccessful 
nuisance suit.198 Several states have incorporated similar language 
into their RTF laws.199 
Beginning in 1992, the North Carolina General Assembly took 
additional steps to limit a plaintiff’s ability to bring a nuisance action 
against a neighboring agricultural facility. The legislature first 
extended nuisance protections to forestry operations in 1992.200 In 
1995, North Carolina enacted legislation requiring pre-trial mediation 
for all farm nuisance disputes.201 The failure of a party to engage in 
mediation prior to bringing a nuisance action could result in the 
 
A farm or farm operation is in accordance with subsection one of section two and 
shall not be found to be a public or private nuisance as a result of any of the 
following: 
  1.  A change in ownership or size. 
  2.  Temporary cessation or interruption of farming. 
  3.  Enrollment in government programs. 
  4.  Adoption of new technology. 
  5.  A change in the type of farm product being produced. 
Id. 
198.  Id. The ALEC model act provides that “[i]n any nuisance action brought in 
which a farm or farm operation is alleged to be a nuisance, if the defendant farm or farm 
operation prevails, the farm or farm operation may recover from the plaintiff the actual 
amount of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonable [sic] 
incurred by the farm or farm operation in connection with the defense of the action, 
together with reasonable and actual attorneys’ fees.” Id. 
199.  See, e.g., Act of April 13, 2005, No. 2257, sec. 5, §	2-4-107, 2005 Ark. Acts 9681, 
9683–84 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE. ANN. §	2-4-107 (2015)) (incorporating 
substantially similar language regarding circumstances under which farms will not be 
found a nuisance); Act of June 20, 1995, No. 94, §	286.473, 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts. 1065, 
1066–68 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS §	286.473 (2015))(using almost 
verbatim language regarding circumstances under which farms will not be found a 
nuisance and attorney fees); Act of May 11, 2009, ch. 147, sec. 1, 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws 
508, 509 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, §	1.1 (2015))(inserted fee-shifting 
provision and statute of repose). 
200.  Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, §	106-700, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441, 441–43 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015)). 
201.  Act of July 27, 1995, ch. 500, sec. 1, §	7A-38.3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1489, 1492–
94 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-38.3 (2015)). See Powell v. Bulluck, 155 
N.C. App. 613, 615–17, 573 S.E.2d 699, 701–02 (2002) (discussing the statutory 
requirements and clarifying that “[t]he statute does not require that all interested parties, 
who may later become plaintiffs, join in the request for mediation”). The stated purpose of 
requiring mediated settlement conferences is “to facilitate the settlement of superior court 
civil actions and to make civil litigation more economical, efficient, and satisfactory to 
litigants and the State.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-38.1 (2015). Note that the 2013 amendment 
further amended the tolling provision of the statute to provide that “[t]he filing of a 
request for prelitigation mediation under subsection (d) of this section does not constitute 
the commencement or the bringing of an action involving a farm nuisance dispute.” N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	7A-38.3(h) (2015). 
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dismissal of the case.202 The protections afforded to agricultural 
facilities were substantially broadened following the 2013 
amendments to the RTF law. 
B. The 2013 Amendments to the North Carolina RTF Law 
On July 17, 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly 
amended the state’s RTF law to further limit the remedies available 
to neighboring landowners in agricultural nuisance actions, extending 
protections to agricultural and forestry operations well beyond the 
scope of the original law.203 The amendments closely resembled 
language contained in the model bill proposed by ALEC,204 as well as 
the amended RTF statute in Indiana.205 The North Carolina 
legislature amended the RTF law only weeks after plaintiffs filed 
hundreds of nuisance suits against Murphy-Brown arising from its 
operation of industrial hog facilities.206 A comparison of the 
legislative history and the timeline of the litigation strongly suggests 
that the proposed amendments were modified to apply to the 
developing litigation.207 After Governor McCrory signed the 
amendments into law on July 18, 2013, the law went into effect 
 
202.  §	7A-38.3(c) (potentially serving as a barrier to plaintiffs in agricultural nuisance 
suits).  
203.  Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701 (2015)). The Act was entitled “An Act 
to Provide that Agricultural and Forestry Operations Are Not Nuisances Under Certain 
Circumstances and to Provide for the Award of Costs and Attorneys’ Fees.” Id.  
204.  See Right to Farm Act, supra note 195; Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175 
(discussing the fee-shifting provision in the ALEC model RTF).  
205.  IND. CODE ANN. §	32-30-6-9.5 (West 2015). 
206.  See Michaels, supra note 27 (noting the Wake County court received close to 
600 complaints during the first week of July). 
207.  On July 3, 2013, the plaintiffs involved in the nuisance litigation began to file 
and serve prelitigation farm nuisance mediation demands. See, e.g., Request for 
Prelitigation Mediation of Farm Nuisance Dispute, No. 13-R-685 Blanks v. Smithfield 
Foods, Inc., (N.C. Super. Ct. July 3, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
On July 17, 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a significantly amended 
version of the bill. See H.R. 614, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (Proposed 
Conference Comm. Substitute H614-PCCS80415-TQ-3, July 16, 2013). This final version 
of the bill, as enacted, incorporated a new section to stating that “[t]he filing of a request 
for prelitigation mediation under subsection (d) of this section does not constitute the 
commencement or the bringing of an action involving a farm nuisance dispute.” Act of 
July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 2, §	7A-38.3(h) 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 859 (codified as 
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. §	7A-38.3(h) (2015)) Prior versions of the amendment 
provided that the bill would become effective on October 1, 2013. See, e.g., H.R. 614, 2013 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as adopted in S. Comm. on Agric., Env’t, & Nat. 
Res, June 11, 2013). However, the final version was altered to state that “[t]his act is 
effective when it becomes law and applies to actions commenced or brought on or after 
that date.” Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 859.  
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immediately, applying to all actions commenced on or after that 
date.208  
The amended RTF law imposes substantial limitations on the 
equitable relief available to plaintiffs in agricultural nuisance suits. In 
contrast to the holding in Durham v. Britt, the amendment narrowly 
defines what constitutes a “fundamental change” that would preclude 
the defendant from raising an affirmative defense to liability under 
the act.209 The amended statute provides that:  
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section [providing 
nuisance immunity] shall not apply when the plaintiff 
demonstrates that the agricultural or forestry operation has 
undergone a fundamental change. A fundamental change to the 
operation does not include any of the following: 
(1) A change in ownership or size. 
(2) An interruption of farming for a period of no more than 
three years. 
(3) Participation in a government-sponsored agricultural 
program. 
(4) Employment of new technology. 
(5) A change in the type of agricultural or forestry product 
produced.210 
Even though the amended statute implicitly recognizes the limitations 
imposed by North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt,211 
the enumerated exceptions may foreclose the possibility that any 
 
208.  Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 3, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859.  
209.  See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 254–55, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994) (noting 
that “a fundamental change could consist of a significant change in the type of agricultural 
operation, or a significant change in the hours of the agricultural operation”).  
210.  Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(a1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a1) (2015)). Note that the original 
version of the act sought to define these changes as “methods or practices that are 
commonly or reasonably associated with agricultural or forestry production" that created 
a rebuttable presumption that the agricultural or forestry operation was not a nuisance. 
H.R. 614, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as referred to the House Agricultural 
Committee on April 10, 2013).  
211.  The use of the term “fundamental change” within the amended statute strongly 
suggests that the drafters intended to explicitly address the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals’ holding in Durham v. Britt. See §	106-701(a1); Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254–55, 
451 S.E.2d at 3 (“[W]e do not believe the legislature intended [the North Carolina RTF 
statute] to cover situations in which a party fundamentally changes the nature of the 
agricultural activity which had theretofore been covered under the statute.”) (emphasis 
omitted). The use of the term “significant change” in similar statutes in other states 
further supports this contention. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §	32-30-6-9(d)(1) (West 2015). 
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agricultural facility could undergo a fundamental change within the 
meaning of the statute.212  
The modifications to the subsection providing for the affirmative 
defense under the law further reinforce this interpretation.213 
Whereas the prior version of the statute precluded qualifying 
operations from nuisance liability due to “changed conditions in or 
about the locality thereof after the same operation has been in 
operation for more than one year,” the legislation modified this 
provision to refer only to “changed conditions in or about the locality 
outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for 
more than a year.”214 Considering these modifications to the statute, 
it remains unclear what, if anything, would constitute a fundamental 
change to preclude the applicability of the nuisance defense.215 While 
the defendant bears the initial burden of raising an affirmative 
defense under the North Carolina RTF law,216 the amended statute 
places a potentially high burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence 
of a fundamental change.217 
Additionally, the amendment added a fee-shifting provision, 
which requires the award of attorneys’ fees in a nuisance action if 
 
212.  See Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175 (noting that a reasonable interpretation of 
the ALEC model bill would permit an alfalfa farmer to change his operations into a hog 
farm without resetting the one-year statute of repose); infra Section III.C. 
213.  See Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 
858 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2015)). The amended version 
of section (a) states: “No agricultural or forestry operation or any of its appurtenances 
shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in or about the 
locality outside of the operation after the operation has been in operation for more than 
one year, when such operation was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.” N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2015) (emphasis added). 
214.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2011); Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec 1, §	106-
701(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-
701(a) (2015)) (emphasis added). 
215.  See infra Section III.C. 
216.  See supra notes 127–131 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory 
interpretation of the North Carolina RTF Act and burden of proof). 
217.  §	106-700–01(a1); see infra Section III.C (discussing the interpretation of a 
similar statutory provision by the Indiana state and federal courts). The legislation also 
created a separate subsection for the preexisting exception to nuisance immunity in cases 
when the “nuisance results from the negligent or improper operation of any agricultural or 
forestry operation or its appurtenances.” §	106-701(a2). As a result of this change, the 
amended statute could be interpreted to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to raise 
the claim of negligent or improper operation, as well. See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 
N.E.2d 850, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the defendant had the burden of raising 
the affirmative defense under the Indiana RTF statute, while plaintiff had the burden of 
proof for the exception for negligent operation due to its inclusion in a “subsequent, 
separate, and distinct subsection” within the statute). 
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either party asserts a “frivolous or malicious” claim.218 As originally 
proposed, the amendment would have awarded attorneys’ fees to any 
prevailing defendant in any agricultural nuisance claim.219 However, 
the final language represents a compromise position, allowing each 
party to recover attorneys’ fees only in cases where the other is found 
to have asserted a “frivolous or malicious” claim.220 Considering the 
limited scope of the provision to “frivolous or malicious” claims, it 
remains to be seen whether the fee-shifting provision will serve as a 
significant barrier to potential litigants.221  
Finally, the amendment expanded the definition of forestry 
operations to cover “sawmill operations.”222 This change is 
particularly significant considering the recent growth of the wood 
pellet industry in North Carolina.223 The expanded definition makes it 
 
218.  Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(f), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700–01(f) (2015)). The statute provides 
that:  
In a nuisance action against an agricultural or forestry operation, the court shall 
award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to: 
(1) The agricultural or forestry operation when the court finds the operation was 
not a nuisance and the nuisance action was frivolous or malicious; or 
(2) The plaintiff when the court finds the agricultural or forestry operation was a 
nuisance and the operation asserted an affirmative defense in the nuisance action 
that was frivolous and malicious.  
§	106-701(f). 
219.  H.R. 614, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (as referred to the House 
Agricultural Committee on April 10, 2013) (“In any civil action in which an agricultural or 
forestry operation is alleged to be a nuisance, a prevailing defendant shall recover the 
aggregate amount of costs and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably 
incurred in the defense of the nuisance action, including a reasonable amount for 
attorneys’ fees.”) (emphasis added). This original language closely aligned with the fee-
shifting provision in the model ALEC RTF law. See Right to Farm Act, supra note 195; see 
also Zboreak, supra note 36, at 175–76 (discussing ALEC’s model RTF law). 
220.  §	106-701(f). 
221.  The “frivolous and malicious” language within the provision suggests that a 
moving party would have to meet a significant burden in order to recover attorneys’ fees. 
See id. However, the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the amended law may 
still serve as a barrier for potential litigants. See Hamilton, supra note 73, at 111. 
(discussing the potential impact of a similar “soft” fee-shifting provision enacted in Iowa). 
222.  See Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(b1), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 
859 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(b1) (2015)) (removing the 
language “but not sawmill operations” from the definition of “forestry operations in the 
existing law); id. (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean those 
activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.”).  
223.  See Amanda Rodriguez, Monster Enviva Wood Pellet Plants Invade Northeast 
NC Communities, DOGWOOD ALLIANCE (Mar. 12, 2014), http:// www.dogwoodalliance
.org/2014/03/monster-enviva-wood-pellet-plants-invade-northeast-nc-communities/ [https://
perma.cc/H6PJ-LLRR]; Tom Zeller Jr., Wood Pellets Are Big Business (And For Some, a 
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much more likely that these facilities would be considered a “forestry 
operation” covered under the RTF law.224 The size and scale of these 
facilities225 illustrates the rationale for expressly excluding “sawmill 
operation[s]” in the original amendment to the RTF law in 1992.226 
These industrial wood pellet facilities operate twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week, creating significant amounts of noise, light, 
and dust as well as increased traffic within the surrounding 
community.227 Prior to the 2013 amendment, the operation of the two 
existing facilities had incited protests from neighboring residents.228 
Under the amended RTF law, some of these facilities may be able to 
raise an affirmative defense against claims brought by residents of the 
community that preceded the facility.229 Similar to the operation of 
CAFOs within the state, the nature of these facilities and their impact 
 
Big Worry), FORBES (Feb. 1, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomzeller
/2015/02/01/wood-pellets-are-big-business-and-for-some-a-big-worry/ [https://perma.cc/6HPJ-
PMR2]. The development of this industry has been driven largely by the soaring demand 
for wood pellets in Europe associated with government policies to encourage renewable 
fuel sources. See Zeller, supra. 
224.  See §	106-701(b1) (defining “forestry operation[s]” as “those activities involved 
in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees”). 
225.  The wood pellet manufacturer, Enviva is currently operating two wood pellet 
facilities in the state with a combined capacity to produce approximately 880 metric tons, 
or 1.9 billion pounds, of wood pellets per year. See Enviva Pellets Northampton, ENVIVA, 
http://www.envivabiomass.com/manufacturing-operations/northampton/ [https://perma.cc
/B66P-S65X] (noting the facility has a total production capacity of 510,000 metric tons per 
year); Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, ENVIVA, http://www.envivabiomass.com/manufacturing-
operations/ahoskie/ [https://perma.cc/879S-62B7] (“Enviva Pellets Ahoskie has a 
production capacity of approximately 370K metric tons and operates 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week.”). In addition, Enviva is in the process of constructing two new facilities in 
North Carolina that will effectively double its production capacity. See Chick Jacobs, 
Work Begins on Wood Pellet Plant in Sampson County, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Feb. 
22, 2015), http://www.fayobserver.com/news/local/work-begins-on-wood-pellet-plant-in-
sampson-county/article_0114d6a2-0746-55e4-b800-1c024fd5ec8f.html [https://perma.cc
/URU6-9BNA] (reporting that the wood pellet plant in Sampson County is under 
construction and that construction will begin on another plant in Richmond County once 
it is completed); Enviva Pellets Sampson, LLC, ENVIVA, http://www.envivabiomass.com
/enviva-pellets-sampson-llc/ [https://perma.cc/6YCC-9WDJ] (noting production capacity 
of 500,000 metric tons per year). 
226.  See Act of July 8, 1992, ch. 892, sec. 1, §	106-701(b1), 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 441, 
441 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(b1) (2015)).  
227.  See Rodriguez, supra note 223 (“Residents close to the plant have faced 24/7 
extreme noise levels and bright lights. They’ve lived with sticky wood dust that coats cars, 
buildings and lungs in just a few minutes, as well as dangerous, heavy truck traffic.”); 
Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, supra note 225 (“Enviva Pellets Ahoskie has a production capacity 
of approximately 370K metric tons and operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”). 
228.  See Rodriguez, supra note 223. 
229.  For example, the Enviva facility in Ahoskie may be able to raise this defense as 
it was built on the site of a former Georgia-Pacific sawmill. Enviva Pellets Ahoskie, supra 
note 225. 
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on surrounding communities do not fit squarely within the proposed 
justification of the law to “reduce the loss to the State of its 
agricultural and forestry resources[.]”230 
C. The Example of Indiana: An Argument for a Broad Interpretation 
of the Amended North Carolina RTF Act 
 While North Carolina’s amended RTF law has yet been subject 
to judicial review as of this writing, the passage and interpretation of 
Indiana’s RTF law may provide guidance about the potential 
implications for agricultural nuisance suits in North Carolina. While 
other states have made similar reforms to their RTF acts,231 the 
Indiana RTF statute perhaps most closely resembles the amended 
North Carolina law.232 In 2005, Indiana amended its RTF law to add 
similar limitations on what would constitute a significant change in 
operation for a facility to lose its nuisance immunity under the RTF 
law.233 In addition, Indiana further amended its RTF statute in 2012 
to provide a similar fee-shifting provision.234 Prior to the passage of 
the 2013 amendments to the RTF law in North Carolina, the Indiana 
state courts, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
interpreted the amended Indiana RTF statute favorably for 
agricultural interests.235 
Before Indiana amended its RTF law in 2005, the law expressly 
limited nuisance protections for agricultural operations in cases where 
there was a “significant change in the type of operation.”236 Similar to 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt, the Indiana 
 
230.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701 (2015). These facilities provide substantial economic 
benefits to the region. See Zeller, supra note 223; Jacobs, supra note 225 (noting the two 
new Enviva wood pellet facilities are projected to provide 160 permanent jobs). On the 
other hand, many environmental groups question whether this extractive industry 
provides a sustainable development model for the region. See Zeller, supra note 223. 
231.  See, e.g., Act of April 13, 2005, No. 2257, sec. 5, §	2-4-107, 2005 Ark. Acts 9681, 
9683–84 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE. ANN. §	2-4-107 (2015)); Act of June 20, 
1995, No. 94, §	286.473, 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts. 1065, 1066–68 (codified as amended at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §	286.473 (2015)).  
232.  Note, however, the Indiana RTF law does not exclude a finding of significant 
change due to an interruption in the operation of a facility like the amended North 
Carolina law. Compare IND. CODE §	32-30-6-9(d)(1) (2015), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-
701(a1)(2) (2015).  
233.  Act of Apr. 14, 2005, Pub. L. No. 23, sec. 1, §	32-30-6-9(d), 2005 Ind. Acts 1389, 
1389–90 (codified as amended at IND. CODE §	32-30-6-9.5 (2015)).  
234.  Act of Mar. 15, 2012, Pub. L. No. 73, sec. 1, 2012 Ind. Acts 1047, 1047 (codified 
as amended at IND. CODE §	32-30-6-9.5 (2015)). 
235.  See Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, 517 F. App'x 518, 519 (7th Cir. 
2013); Parker v. Obert’s Legacy Dairy, LLC, 988 N.E.2d 319, 324–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
236. IND. CODE §	32-30-6-9 (2004). 
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Court of Appeals interpreted the prior version of the Indiana statute 
to preclude a defendant from raising an affirmative defense in cases 
“where there has been either a significant change in the hours of 
operation or a significant change in the type of operation.”237 
However, the 2005 amendment modified the statute to provide that:  
(1) A significant change in the type of agricultural operation 
does not include the following: 
(A) The conversion from one type of agricultural operation 
to another type of agricultural operation. 
(B) A change in the ownership or size of the agricultural 
operation. 
(C) The (i) enrollment or (ii) reduction or cessation of 
participation of the agricultural operation in a 
government program. 
(D) Adoption of new technology by the agricultural 
operation. 
(2) The operation would not have been a nuisance at the time 
the agricultural or industrial operation began on that locality.238 
In cases applying the amended statute, Indiana and federal courts 
have uniformly held that a significant change does not occur where 
the agricultural operation changes from one type of agricultural 
product to another.239  
In Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC,240 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this 
 
237.  Laux v. Chopin Land Assocs., 550 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Similar 
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Durham v. Britt, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
in Laux held that the change from the cultivation of grain to hog farm constituted a 
significant change under the statute. Id. at 103; see Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 
255, 451 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1994). However, the court held that the expansion of the hog facility 
did not constitute a significant change under the statute. Laux, 550 N.E.2d at 103.  
238.  IND. CODE ANN. §	32-30-6-9(d) (West 2015). 
239.  See, e.g., Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 519 (affirming the district court’s statutory 
interpretation of the act); Dalzell v. Country View Family Farms, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-1567-
WTL-MJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773, at *13 n.9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2012) (“Thus 
while the change from a crop farm to a pig farm was a ‘significant change’ under the Act as 
it existed in Laux, it is not today.”); Parker, 988 N.E.2d at 324–25 (affirming summary 
judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the conversion of crop land to a dairy 
farm did not constitute a significant change). In Parker, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that “the legislature could not have intended the Act to 
apply to long-time residents whose daily, rural life suffers at the hands of a “factory-like 
‘mega-farm.’	” Parker, 988 N.E.2d at 324. The court noted that “it is clear that the Act 
insulates the [defendant’s] expansion of their dairy farm from nuisance suits under these 
circumstances.” Id. at 325. 
240.  517 F. App'x 518 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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interpretation of the amended statute.241 In that case, the defendant 
purchased a farm that had been used to plant beans and corn.242 After 
growing crops on the property for one year, the defendant converted 
the property into an industrial hog farm that housed 2,800 swine.243 
The neighboring property owners who had lived there prior to the 
defendant brought a nuisance suit against the farm.244 Affirming the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for the agricultural 
producer,245 the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the RTF act should not be applicable because they did 
not “come to the nuisance.”246 In support of its holding, the court 
noted that the land in question had been in agricultural use since 
1956, and affirmed that a change in the type of agricultural operation 
does not constitute a significant change under the amended RTF 
statute.247  
The Seventh Circuit in Dalzell also adopted a strict 
interpretation of the statutory exemption for the affirmative defense 
in cases of negligent operation.248 In spite of substantial evidence that 
the defendant operated several aspects of the farm negligently, the 
court affirmed the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that the negligent operation was the proximate cause of 
the alleged nuisance.249 The district court noted ten separate instances 
in which the farm in question had been operated in a negligent 
manner, including several instances of poor husbandry and odor 
control practices, land application of manure directly adjacent to 
neighboring property lines, and negligent management of the 
“mortality composter.”250 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that 
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the nuisance “result[ed] from” 
 
241.  Id. at 519. 
242.  Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773, at *3. 
243.  Id. at *3. 
244.  Id. 
245.  Id. at *14–15, *21–23. 
246.  Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 519.  
247.  Id. 
248.  See id. at 520. The relevant provision of the Indiana RTF law states: “This 
section does not apply if a nuisance results from the negligent operation of an agricultural 
or industrial operation or its appurtenances.” IND. CODE ANN. §	32-30-6-9(a) (West 2015). 
249.  Dalzell, 517 F. App’x at 520. The Seventh Circuit placed particular emphasis on 
the plaintiffs’ failure to quantify the relative contribution of the odor due to the 
defendant’s negligent operation of the facility. Id. 
250.  Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773 at *15–16.  
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the negligent operation because the plaintiff failed to provide 
sufficient evidence linking the odor to the defendant’s negligence.251  
Even though the interpretation of the Indiana RTF act is not 
binding authority on a North Carolina court, it does suggest that the 
North Carolina RTF law provides broad protections to agricultural 
and forestry facilities from nuisance liability. However, the exact 
scope of these protections deserves further attention in light of the 
statutory text and existing jurisprudence in North Carolina. 
D. The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of the Amended North 
Carolina RTF Law 
 The extensive protections afforded to agricultural facilities in the 
amended North Carolina RTF law favor a narrow interpretation of 
the existing statute, particularly in light of the constitutional concerns 
under the Fifth Amendment discussed in Part IV. The law should be 
interpreted more consistently with its stated purpose to protect 
agricultural land from encroachment by non-agricultural uses.252 In 
light of the broad enumerated exclusions in the statute, it remains 
unclear what would constitute a “fundamental change” that would 
preclude a defendant from raising an affirmative defense to 
liability.253 However, it is a basic tenant of statutory interpretation 
that every term within a statute is presumed to have meaning and be 
given effect.254 To prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule, 
 
251.  Dalzell, 517 F. App'x at 520. The district court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim that such causation should be presumed to be “within the understanding of an 
ordinary layperson,” noting that “[t]he problem is that neither the Plaintiffs nor their 
expert are able to say that Sky View would not be a nuisance but for the (alleged) fact that 
it is negligently operated.” Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130773 at *21 n.12. 
252.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015) (“When other land uses extend into 
agricultural and forest areas, agricultural and forestry operations often become the subject 
of nuisance suits. As a result, agricultural and forestry operations are sometimes forced to 
cease. Many others are discouraged from making investments in farm and forest 
improvements.”). 
253.  See id. §	106-701(a1). The statute provides that a defendant is precluded from 
raising an affirmative defense when “the plaintiff demonstrates that the agricultural or 
forestry operation has undergone a fundamental change.” Id. On its face, the statute 
excludes many potential changes from consideration, including a change in size or 
ownership, change in the type of agricultural or forestry operation, an interruption in 
operation for less than three years, and use of a new technology. Id. 
254.  Neil v. Kuester Real Estate Servs., Inc., 237 N.C. App. 132,146, 764 S.E.2d 498, 
508 (2014) (“[W]e presume that no part of a statute is mere surplusage, but that each 
provision adds something not otherwise included therein.”) (quoting Fort v. Cty. of 
Cumberland, 218 N.C. App. 401, 407, 721 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2012)). 
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there must be some changes in operations that would be considered a 
“fundamental change” under the statute.255 
The narrow definition of “fundamental change” brings new 
importance to what constitutes an agricultural or forestry operation 
under the RTF statute. Agricultural and forestry operations may be 
permitted to tack on consecutive prior uses and change the type of 
operation or ownership without restarting the one-year statutory 
limitation.256 Considering the broad statutory definition of 
“agricultural operation,”257 it seems likely that many agricultural 
facilities will be shielded under the Act.258 On the other hand, forestry 
operations are defined more narrowly under the statute.259 While 
removing the sawmill exclusion in the statute does suggest that the 
law should cover at least some sawmill operations,260 the statute does 
not extend protections to all such facilities “without limitation.”261 
 
255.  For example, a “significant change in the hours of the agricultural operation” 
may be considered a fundamental change that does not fall under the exclusion because it 
was expressly mentioned in Durham v. Britt and was not subsequently included in the 
amendment. 117 N.C. App. 250, 255, 451 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994). 
256.  See supra notes 213–217 and accompanying text; Dalzell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
130773, at *13 n.9 (“Thus while the change from a crop farm to a pig farm was a 
‘significant change’ under the Act as it existed in Laux, it is not today.”). One 
interpretation of the law would permit an agricultural operation to significantly change the 
scope and type of its operations, but still raise the affirmative defense under the RTF Act 
if the prior operation was entitled to protections under the Act. See supra Section III.C 
(discussing the interpretation of a similar RTF law in Indiana); Zboreak, supra note 36, at 
175 (discussing the interpretation of a similar provision contained in ALEC’s Model RTF 
law).  
257.  §	106-701(b) (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘agricultural operation’ includes, 
without limitation, any facility for the production for commercial purposes of crops, 
livestock, poultry, livestock products, or poultry products.”) (emphasis added). 
258.  See Durham, 117 N.C. App. at 254, 451 S.E.2d at 3 (“We believe the legislature 
intended this statute to cover any agricultural operation, without limitation, when the 
operation was initially begun.”).  
259.  §	106-701(b1) (“For the purposes of this Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean 
those activities involved in the growing, managing, and harvesting of trees.”)  
260.  See id. §	106-701(b1); Act of July 18, 2013, ch. 314, sec. 1, §	106-701(b1) 2013 
N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701 (2015)). 
261.  Unlike the definition of agricultural operations, the RTF law does not apply to 
all forestry operations “without limitation.” Compare §	106-701(b) (“For the purposes of 
this Article, ‘agricultural operation’ includes, without limitation, any facility for the 
production for commercial purposes of crops, livestock, poultry, livestock products, or 
poultry products.”) (emphasis added), with id. §	106-701(b1) (“For the purposes of this 
Article, ‘forestry operation’ shall mean those activities involved in the growing, managing, 
and harvesting of trees.”). Similar to the distinction drawn between an industrial hog farm 
and traditional farming techniques in Durham v. Britt, the underlying rationale to protect 
farmland from non-agricultural development supports a limited reading of the statute. See 
supra notes 167–172 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 223–227 and 
accompanying text (noting the size and scale of wood pellet facilities in operation in North 
Carolina and their impact on the surrounding communities).  
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Regardless, the broad statutory definitions of agricultural and forestry 
operations under the RTF law could have significant implications for 
neighboring landowners in agricultural nuisance suits. 
Considering the phrase “changed condition” in light of the 
statutory purpose and its prior interpretation by the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, the application of the RTF act should be limited to 
“case[s] in which the non-agricultural use extended into an 
agricultural area.”262 Absent an underlying change in the use of a 
neighboring property, a defendant should not be able to raise an 
affirmative defense under the RTF act simply because there was a 
change in ownership. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to interpret a 
statute that supposedly codifies the doctrine of “coming to the 
nuisance” as allowing only one party to benefit from tacking on prior 
use. Similarly, the RTF law should not apply in nuisance suits 
between two agricultural facilities, as the application of nuisance 
protections under these circumstances does not align with the stated 
purpose of the RTF law.263 
The existing limitations on plaintiffs bringing agricultural 
nuisance suits further support a narrow interpretation of the statute. 
As seen in Dalzell v. Country View Farms,264 the difficulty of proving 
whether a nuisance “results from” the negligent operation of a facility 
 
262.  Mayes v. Tabor, 77 N.C. App. 197, 201, 334 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1985). But see 
Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel, 983 N.E.2d 463, 467 (Ill. 2012) (reversing the denial of summary 
judgment, holding that the plaintiffs’ acquisition of the property constituted a “changed 
condition” giving rise to the application of the Illinois RTF even though the non-
agricultural use predated the agricultural facility). In Mayes v. Tabor, the court placed 
particular emphasis on the length of time the property had been used for non-agricultural 
purposes rather than how long the property had been in possession of its present owner. 
77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491 (noting the private summer camp had been in 
existence for sixty years). 
263.  See Mayes, 77 N.C. App. at 201, 334 S.E.2d at 491. Other states, including 
Indiana, have similarly interpreted their RTF laws to not apply in nuisance actions 
between two agricultural facilities. See TDM Farms, Inc. v. Wilhoite Fam. Farm, LLC, 969 
N.E.2d 97, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Stickdorn v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 n.5 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2011); see also Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. Pshp., No. CS-95-236-FVS, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780, at *11 (E.D. Wash. May 29, 1998) (“[The Washington RTF] 
should not be read to insulate agricultural enterprises from nuisance actions brought by an 
agricultural or other rural plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff occupied the land before the 
nuisance activity was established.” (quoting Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d 
610, 616 (Wash. 1998)); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A. Feitshans, Nuisance 
Revisited after Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121, 133–35 (2000) 
(discussing the court’s interpretation in the Buchanan cases). 
264.  See Dalzell v. Country View Fam. Farms, LLC, 517 F. App’x 518, 520 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
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could limit equitable relief under the current law.265 In addition, a 
plaintiff’s alternative means of redress are limited by strict local 
zoning ordinances regulating agricultural facilities.266 North Carolina 
courts have not yet addressed whether the RTF law could be applied 
to bar certain trespass actions.267 Outside of the protections afforded 
to agricultural facilities under the RTF statute, plaintiffs also face 
both procedural and substantive barriers to bringing a cognizable 
nuisance claim.268 Together, these limitations on individual property 
rights may render the RTF law unconstitutional under the Takings 
Clause. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA’S RTF ACT UNDER 
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
As agricultural facilities have been granted greater protections 
from nuisance suits at the expense of neighboring landowners, the 
constitutionality of many RTF laws under the Takings Clause has 
been called into question.269 While constitutional challenges have 
 
265.  However, the North Carolina RTF law may arguably provide more protection 
for potential plaintiffs as it applies to both “negligent” and “improper” operation of a 
facility as opposed to only “negligent” operation. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a2) 
(2015) (applying to both improper and negligent operation), with IND. CODE ANN. §	32-
30-6-9(a) (West 2015) (applying to negligent operation only). 
266.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(d) (2015). In addition, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina has held that the state laws regarding the siting and regulation of swine 
facilities preempt any local ordinances regulating those facilities. Craig v. Cty. of Chatham, 
356 N.C. 40, 50, 565 S.E.2d 172, 179 (2002); see Christy Noel, Recent Development, 
Preemption Hogwash: North Carolina’s Judicial Repeal of Local Authority to Regulate 
Hog Farms in Craig v. County of Chatham, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 2121, 2121–24 (2002) 
(discussing implications of Craig v. County of Chatham). 
267.  Compare Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd., 952 P.2d 610, 618 (Wash. 1998) 
(holding that right-to-farm law did not preclude trespass actions due to legislative history 
and express damages savings provision within the statute), with Rancho Viejo v. Tres 
Amigos Viejos, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 489–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (distinguishing the 
holding in Buchanan to bar certain trespass actions on the basis that a California provision 
did not contain an express damages clause). 
268.  From a procedural standpoint, failure to comply with the requirements for 
mediated prelitigation settlement conferences prior to commencing a nuisance action may 
also serve as a bar to recovery. See supra notes 202 and accompanying text. In addition, 
plaintiffs may face certain hurdles in bringing a cognizable legal claim. See In re N.C. 
Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-13-BR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83157, at *78 
(E.D.N.C. June 24, 2015) (noting that it is unclear whether “annoyance and discomfort” 
damages are available within the context of a temporary nuisance action in North 
Carolina); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 116–17, 574 
S.E.2d 48, 53 (2002) (holding that riparian waterfront owners and river-preservation 
associations failed to establish special damages in public nuisance suit against hog 
producers, as aesthetic and recreational interests alone are insufficient to confer standing). 
269.  See, e.g., Centner, supra note 140, at 88–89; Duke & Malcolm, supra note 18, at 
297–98.  
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been raised against RTF laws across the country,270 as of this writing, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to hold that an 
RTF law effected an unconstitutional taking.271 In light of the broad 
protections afforded to agricultural facilities, the amended North 
Carolina RTF law raises significant constitutional concerns, 
particularly as a regulatory taking. 
A. General Overview of Takings Jurisprudence 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”272 Applicable to both federal and state 
governments under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,273 the 
Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but 
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”274 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the reasonable exercise of a 
state’s police power permits some interference with the property 
rights of individuals without giving rise to a compensable taking.275 
The Takings Clause, however, “bar[s] Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”276 In addition to the cases 
where “the government directly appropriates private property for 
public use,”277 the Supreme Court has held that “if a regulation goes 
 
270.  See infra notes 300–336 and accompanying text. 
271.  Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 173–74, 179 (Iowa 2004) (holding 
nuisance-related RTF statute unconstitutional under the inalienable rights clause and 
takings clause of the Iowa Constitution); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 
321–22 (Iowa 1998) (holding a zoning-related RTF provision to be an unconstitutional 
taking under both the federal and state constitution).  
272.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
273.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chi., B. & Q.R. 
Co. v. Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)). 
274.  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)). 
275.  See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 321–22 (2002) (“[T]he Constitution contains no comparable reference to regulations 
that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property.”). On the 
other hand, any state action may still violate the Due Process Clause if it is found to be 
“arbitrary and irrational.” E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). While the Court has 
noted that a regulation with a severe retroactive application may give rise to a successful 
due process challenge, the Court has generally been reluctant to invalidate economic 
legislation under the Due Process Clause. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 537. 
276.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
277.  Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 324 (quoting E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 522). 
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too far it will be recognized as a taking.”278 Nevertheless, the proper 
test to determine whether a government regulation results in a 
compensable taking is less clear.279  
The United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the test to 
determine whether a government regulation amounts to a taking of 
private property.280 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,281 the 
Court outlined two instances in which government action amounts to 
a per-se categorical taking: (1) when the government causes the 
property owner to suffer a physical invasion of his or her property; 
and (2) when the government regulation “denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of the land.”282 Within the context of 
land-use regulations, the Court in Lucas affirmed that the Fifth 
Amendment imposes limitations on the exercise of the state’s police 
power.283 Similarly, the Court has also recognized that the 
government’s appropriation of an easement on private property may 
give rise to a compensable taking in the context of land-use 
permitting.284  
 In most instances, the question of whether a government 
regulation has “gone too far” requires the court to conduct an “ad 
hoc, factual inquiry,” considering “the character of the action and . . . 
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
 
278.  Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 326 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
415 (1922)). 
279.  See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings 
Theory, 24 PROB. & PROP. 11, 11 (2010). 
280.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19.  
281.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
282.  Id. at 1015. See generally Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 263, at 131–32 
(outlining an interpretation of the test set forth in Lucas).  
283.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (holding that beachfront regulations that prevented the 
plaintiff from building any habitable structure on his property constituted a categorical 
taking). See id. 1022–26 (discussing the limitations on the state’s police power to enjoin 
“harmful and noxious” uses of property). 
284.  See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). Within the context of land use regulations, the Court 
has also recognized the government’s right to “condition approval of a permit on the 
dedication of property to the public so long as there is a nexus and rough proportionality 
between the property that the government demands and the social costs of the applicant’s 
proposal.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
(citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391). While the Court has extended this 
taking analysis from the dedication of an easement to the extraction of monetary fees, this 
constitutional analysis has not been extended beyond the context of a government 
permitting process. See id. at 2599–601; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546–
48 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan). 
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whole.”285 In Penn Central Co. v. New York City,286 the Supreme 
Court identified three factors to consider when determining whether 
a taking has occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on 
the property owner; (2) the property owner’s investment backed 
expectations; and (3) the “character of the government action.”287 
The Penn Central framework has no exact formula and “necessarily 
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic 
effects of government actions.”288  
While the North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly 
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has inferred this 
right from the “law of the land” clause in Article I, Section 19 of the 
North Carolina Constitution.289 North Carolina courts apply a takings 
analysis similar to Penn Central to determine whether a regulation 
constitutes a compensable taking under the North Carolina 
Constitution.290 Outside of the traditional exercise of eminent 
domain, a compensable taking can arise from the unreasonable 
exercise of the state’s police power291 or any “substantial interference 
 
285.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 130–31 (1978)). 
286.  438 U.S. 124 (1978). 
287.  Id.  
288.  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
523 (1992)). 
289.  Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water Auth. v. Unger, 154 N.C. App. 589, 592, 572 S.E.2d 
832, 834 (2002) (quoting Finch v. City of Durham, 325 N.C. 352, 363, 384 S.E.2d 8, 14 
(1989), reh’g denied, 325 N.C. 714, 388 S.E.2d 452–53 (1989)); see N.C. CONST. art. I, §	19 
(“No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, 
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by 
the law of the land.”). “A ‘taking’ has been defined as ‘entering upon private property for 
more than a momentary period, and under warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it 
to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a 
way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment 
thereof.’	” E. Appraisal Servs. v. State, 118 N.C. App. 692, 695, 457 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1995) 
(quoting Stillings v. City of Winston-Salem, 311 N.C. 689, 692, 319 S.E.2d 233, 236 (1984)). 
290.  See Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, No. 2:11-CV-1-D, 2014 WL 4219516, at 
*11 n.7 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2014) (applying the same takings analysis to assess both the 
federal and state takings claims); King ex rel Warren v. State, 125 N.C. App. 379, 385, 481 
S.E.2d 330, 333–34 (1997) (citing Finch, 325 N.C. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 15; Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)) (noting the similarity between the takings 
analysis set forth in the Supreme Court’s takings analysis in Lucas and that of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s in Finch) . 
291.  The inquiry into whether a compensable taking has occurred largely depends on 
“whether a particular act is an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent 
domain.” Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., __ N.C. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 919, 924 (2016) 
(quoting Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 257 N.C. 507, 514, 126 S.E.2d 732, 737–38 
(1962)). In cases where the state is deemed to have exercised its police power, state courts 
have employed an ends-means test to determine whether: (1) “the ends sought, i.e., the 
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with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the 
property.”292 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized 
that “[a] nuisance maintained by a governmental agency impairing 
private property is a taking in the constitutional sense.”293 However, 
the plaintiff must meet its burden of showing that the property value 
has been “substantially impaired.”294 Within the context of land-use 
regulations, courts have generally limited the finding of a 
compensable regulatory taking to cases where the land owner has 
been “deprived of all practical use and reasonable value of the 
property.”295  
The uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of RTF laws 
largely reflects the ambiguous nature of nuisance-related takings 
cases.296 The maintenance of a nuisance does not fit neatly within the 
traditional distinction between the physical invasion297 and regulation 
of someone’s property298 in takings jurisprudence.299 However, a 
 
object of the legislation, is within the escope of the [police] power”; and (2) “the means 
chosen to regulate are reasonable.” Finch, 325 N.C. at 363, 384 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting 
Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1983)). 
292.  Kirby, __ N.C. __, 786 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 
187, 198–99, 293 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1982) superseded on other grounds by Act of July 10, 
1981, ch. 919, sec. 28, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1382, 1402); see id. at __, 786 S.E.2d at 924 
(defining “property” as “every aspect of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as 
such upon which it is practicable to place a money value” (quoting Hildebrand v. S. Bell 
Tel. v. Tel. Co., 219 N.C. 402, 408, 14 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1941)). 
293.  Midgett v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n, 260 N.C. 241, 248, 132 S.E.2d 599, 606 
(1963) (citing Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 674–75, 71 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1952)), 
overruled on other grounds by Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E.2d 164 
(1983); see Long, 306 N.C. at 198–99, 293 S.E.2d at 109 (“Modern construction of the 
‘taking’ requirement is that an actual occupation of the land, dispossession of the 
landowner or even a physical touching of the land is not necessary; there need only be a 
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the 
property.”). 
294.  Midgett, 260 N.C. at 248, 132 S.E.2d at 606 (citing McKinney v. City of High 
Point, 237 N.C. 66, 76–77, 74 S.E.2d 440, 447–48 (1953)); see Long, 306 N.C. at 200, 293 
S.E.2d at 110 (noting the interference must be “substantial enough to reduce the market 
value of his property.”). 
295.  King, 125 N.C. App. 379, 386, 481 S.E.2d 330, 334 (1997). But see Kirby, __ N.C. 
__, 786 S.E.2d at 925 (holding that indefinite restrictions on development placed on 
properties by the North Carolina Department of Transportation within a proposed 
highway development corridor constituted a compensable regulatory taking). 
296.  See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 819, 812–22 (2006).  
297.  See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 
(1982) (holding the physical installation of cable equipment constituted a categorical 
taking). 
298.  See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 136–38 
(1978) (holding that New York City’s landmarks law did not constitute a regulatory 
taking). 
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nuisance can constitute a compensable taking in certain 
circumstances, particularly under the theory of inverse 
condemnation.300  
In Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.301 the Supreme Court 
offered some guidance as to how to interpret nuisance-related 
cases.302 In Richards, the plaintiff argued that the maintenance of a 
railroad track and tunnel adjacent to his property gave rise to a 
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.303 The Court held 
that “the acts of Congress in the light of the Fifth Amendment, [ ] do 
not authorize the imposition of so direct and peculiar and substantial 
a burden upon plaintiff's property without compensation to him.”304 
The Court noted that “sharing in the common burden of incidental 
damages arising from the legalized nuisance” does not give rise to a 
compensable taking.305 Thus, the Court drew a distinction between 
the harm due to the noise, smoke, and vibrations equally shared 
among his neighbors due to their general proximity to the railroad 
tracks and singular harm to the plaintiff from the operation of a 
fanning system in the railroad tunnel.306 The Court held that a 
compensable taking had occurred solely because of the “peculiar and 
substantial” harm to the plaintiff by operation of the tunnel.307  
 
299.  Ball, supra note 296, at 848–50 (comparing and contrasting nuisance-related 
takings with more traditional regulatory takings). 
300.  Inverse condemnation represents a cause of action where the government 
effects a taking of private property without providing adequate compensation. See Kirby, 
__ N.C. __, 769 S.E.2d at 227. Under this theory, courts have recognized compensable 
takings for nuisance-related claims. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); 
Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914); Cochran v. City of Charlotte, 53 
N.C. App. 390, 406, 281 S.E.2d 179, 191 (1981) (affirming holding that flights of 
commercial aircraft over the plaintiffs’ property gave rise to a compensable taking); 
Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 5, 1 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1939); Hines v. City of 
Rocky Mt., 162 N.C. 409, 412, 78 S.E. 510, 511 (1913) (holding that the odors from a 
municipal trash dump near the plaintiff’s land constituted a nuisance and a taking). 
However, inverse condemnation claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in 
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a) (2015); see Peach v. City of High Point, 199 
N.C. 359, 368, 683 S.E.2d 717, 724 (2009); infra note 337 (discussing the application of the 
statute of limitations).  
301.  233 U.S. 546 (1914). 
302.  Ball, supra note 296, at 829–31. 
303.  Richards, 233 U.S. at 549. 
304.  Id. at 557.  
305.  Id. at 554. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262 (distinguishing the physical invasion 
associated with low-altitude airplane flights over a property with the “incidental damages” 
present in Richards). 
306.  Richards, 233 U.S. at 554.  
307.  Id.; see Spiek v. Mich. Dep’t of Transp., 572 N.W.2d 201, 210 (Mich. 1998) 
(holding that a plaintiff must allege a harm “differs in kind” rather than by degree from 
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Even though Richards remains rather dated in light of the 
framework set forth in Penn Central and its subsequent cases, the 
Court’s distinction between “peculiar and substantial harm” and 
“incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance” provides a 
useful starting point for assessing nuisance-related takings cases.308 A 
review of the cases considering the constitutionality of RTF laws will 
provide a better framework in which to assess the North Carolina 
RTF law. 
B. Constitutionality of RTF Acts Under the Takings Clause  
In interpreting RTF laws under the Takings Clause, state courts 
have been divided as to whether the maintenance of an ongoing 
nuisance rises to the level of a categorical taking.309 Furthermore, 
state courts have yet to explicitly assess the application of an RTF law 
as a regulatory taking under the traditional Penn Central balancing 
analysis.310 Accordingly, it remains unclear how a court would address 
such a constitutional challenge to the North Carolina RTF law in its 
current form. This divergent line of cases suggests that an analysis of 
the RTF law as a regulatory taking could be the appropriate line of 
inquiry in this case.  
 
those living near a public highway to state a takings claim upon which relief could be 
granted). 
308.  Richards, 233 U.S. at 554. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262 (distinguishing the 
physical invasion associated with low-altitude airplane flights over a property with the 
“incidental damages” present in Richards); Spiek, 572 N.W.2d at 208–10 (holding that a 
plaintiff must allege a harm “differs in kind” rather than by degree from those living near 
a public highway to state a takings claim upon which relief could be granted) (citing 
Richards, 233 U.S. at 552–54). Indeed, some have argued that this “peculiar and 
substantial” burden analysis should form the basis for a new intermediate level of scrutiny 
for nuisance cases, adopting a framework that falls between the finding of a categorical 
taking and application of the traditional Penn Central balancing test. Ball, supra note 296, 
at 850. 
309.  The Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to recognize that the 
maintenance of a nuisance creates an easement that rises to the level of a physical 
invasion. See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 2004) (holding 
nuisance-related RTF statute unconstitutional under the takings clause of the Iowa 
Constitution); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 1998) (holding a 
zoning-related RTF provision to be an unconstitutional taking under both the federal and 
state constitution). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged in dictum 
that nuisance immunity from Washington’s RTF created “a quasi easement against the 
urban developments to continue those nuisance activities.” Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders 
Ltd., 952 P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1998). At least three other state courts have rejected this 
approach, based on the jurisprudence within their states. See infra notes 321–329 and 
accompanying text. 
310.  See, e.g., supra notes 311–336 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court of Iowa remains the only court to strike 
down an RTF statute as an unconstitutional taking.311 In Bormann v. 
Board of Supervisors,312 the Supreme Court of Iowa found a zoning-
related RTF statute unconstitutional under both the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment and that of the Iowa Constitution.313 The 
plaintiffs’ properties in question had been designated as “agricultural 
area[s,]” as provided for in the Iowa RTF statute; this approval 
cloaked agricultural facilities with immunity from nuisance suits so 
long as their facilities operated non-negligently.314 Declining to 
analyze the application of the RTF act as a regulatory taking under 
the Penn Central balancing test, the court held that the non-
trespassory invasion associated with the dust and odor from the 
agricultural facility constituted a categorical taking under both the 
federal and state constitutions.315 In support of its holding, the court 
recognized that the nuisance immunity provided under the RTF 
statute created an easement over the adjoining property, which is a 
constitutionally protected property interest under the federal and 
Iowa state constitutions.316  
Furthermore, in Gacke v. Pork Extra, L.L.C.,317 the Supreme 
Court of Iowa reaffirmed the holding in Bormann, and further held a 
nuisance-related RTF statute318 to be in violation of the Takings 
Clause and the “inalienable rights” clause of the Iowa Constitution.319 
 
311.  See infra notes 312–320 and accompanying text.  
312.  584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998). 
313.  Id. at 321. 
314.  Id. at 311–12. 
315.  Id. at 321. “The rule finding constitutionality in close cases cannot control the 
present one, however, because, with all respect, this is not a close case. When all the 
varnish is removed, the challenged statutory scheme amounts to a commandeering of 
valuable property rights without compensating the owners, and sacrificing those rights for 
the economic advantage of a few. In short, it appropriates valuable private property 
interests and awards them to strangers.” Id. at 322. 
316.  Id. at 316 (citing United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910)). In support of 
its holding, the Bormann court cited several cases in which a non-trespassory invasion was 
found to be an unconstitutional taking, analogizing the facts of the case to those in 
Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co. Id. at 319 (citing Richards, 233 U.S. 546 (1914)). 
317.  684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004). 
318.  While similar to the North Carolina RTF in some respects, the statute in Gacke 
differs from the amended North Carolina RTF law in that it lacks any sort of statutory 
waiting period before an agricultural facility may benefit from the nuisance protections. 
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2015), with IOWA CODE ANN. §	657.11(2) (West 
2015). 
319.  Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 174. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 2097 (2016) 
2148 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
However, the Gacke court declined to address whether the statute 
was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.320  
Other states have declined to adopt this interpretation and have 
upheld RTF laws as constitutional under the federal and state takings 
clause, distinguishing Bormann’s holding that the right to maintain a 
nuisance constitutes an easement.321 In Lindsey v. DeGroot,322 the 
Indiana Court of Appeals rejected a constitutional challenge to 
Indiana’s recently amended RTF law.323 The plaintiffs had purchased 
a ten-acre plot of undeveloped woods and built a home in rural 
Indiana.324 Three years later, the defendant converted a neighboring 
hog operation into a large commercial dairy farm.325 As part of its 
operation, the farm maintained large waste lagoons and began 
spraying manure over a field adjacent to the plaintiff’s property.326 
Citing the Supreme Court of Iowa’s decision in Bormann, the plaintiff 
alleged the act was an unconstitutional taking because it created an 
easement over his property.327 In its opinion, the court distinguished 
the holding in Bormann on the grounds that Indiana case law did not 
recognize that the maintenance of a nuisance created an easement.328 
The Lindsey court also declined to address whether the application of 
the RTF could give rise to a compensable taking under the Penn 
Central balancing test.329 
While the existing case law suggests that a court is unlikely to 
find that North Carolina’s amended RTF law gives rise to a 
 
320.  Id. Some commentators have suggested that this dicta on the part of the 
Supreme Court of Iowa reflects that the holding in Bormann may be limited to the Iowa 
Constitution and that the holding in Bormann is erroneous as it relates to the federal 
Takings Clause. See Centner, supra note 140, at 119–20. 
321.  See Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004); Barrera v. 
Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. App. 2004). 
322.  898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
323.  Id. at 1254, 1259 (affirming summary judgment for the defendant and holding 
the Indiana RTF law was constitutional). 
324.  Id.  
325.  Id. 
326.  Lindsey v. DeGroot, No. 35D01-0312-PL-00262, slip op. at 3–5 (Ind. Super. Ct. 
2008).  
327.  Lindsey, 898 N.E.2d at 1257–58 (citing Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 
N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998)).  
328.  Id. at 1258 (citing Barrera v. Hondo Creek Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. 
App. 2004); Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004)); see 
Armstrong v. Maxwell Farms of Ind., Inc., No. 68C01-0912-CT-0539, (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 10, 
2014); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor or Food on The Table: Is Texas’s Right 
to Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public 
Policy Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 968–70 (2010) 
(discussing the court’s holding in Barrera). 
329.  See Lindsey, 898 N.E.2d at 1257–58. 
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categorical taking, the amended RTF law could still be found to be 
unconstitutional as a regulatory taking. Many commentators have 
criticized the holding in Bormann and Gacke, arguing that 
recognizing a nuisance-related easement as a categorical taking 
establishes an overly broad interpretation of the Takings Clause.330 
Given the similarities of Indiana’s RTF statute to the current North 
Carolina RTF statute,331 a court could be less likely to hold that the 
amended RTF law constitutes a categorical taking, particularly in 
light of the existing criticism of the Bormann and Gacke opinions.332  
In light of the issues raised within these divergent opinions, the 
Penn Central balancing test is best suited for determining whether an 
RTF act creates an unconstitutional taking.333 The Supreme Court’s 
analysis of other land-use restrictions under the Penn Central analysis 
provides support for this position.334 As previously discussed, the 
nuisance-related takings cases suggest that a plaintiff may be able to 
 
330.  See Centner, supra note 140, at 122–124 (noting that the creation of an easement 
is not always considered a physical invasion). Some have noted that labeling a nuisance-
related easement as a categorical taking could have significant consequences for a wide 
range of regulatory restrictions. See Richardson & Feitshans, supra note 263, 142–43 
(noting that Bormann will likely remain a minority rule for these reasons); Adam Van 
Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as “Takings” in light of Bormann v. Board of Supervisors 
and Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 169, 191–92 (2006). 
But see Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do with 
Investment-Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 72 
(2004) (“Courts and commentators are sometimes reluctant to apply regulatory takings 
doctrine to the full extent recognized by the Supreme Court. The rationale is often an 
abstract fear that landowners will reap unjust windfalls under the guise of ‘just 
compensation.’	”). 
331.  See supra notes 231–251 and accompanying text. While the Iowa RTF statute in 
Gacke is similar to the North Carolina RTF law in some respects, the Iowa RTF statute 
notably differs from the amended North Carolina RTF law in that it lacks any sort of 
statutory waiting period before an agricultural facility may benefit from the nuisance 
protections. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(a) (2015), with IOWA CODE ANN 
§	657.11(2) (West 2015).  
332.  See supra note 330 and accompanying text.  
333.  See Centner, supra note 140, at 125–26 (noting that the creation of an easement 
is not always considered a physical invasion); Buskirk, supra note 318, at 192–96 (2006) 
(arguing in favor of analysis of right to farm as a regulatory taking under the Penn Central 
balancing test). See also Ball, supra note 296, at 854–55 (critiquing the approach taken in 
Bormann as overly protective of property rights, but arguing for the application of 
intermediate form of scrutiny).  
334.  See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 
(2002) (“[L]and-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values 
in some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per 
se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could 
afford.”); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1992) (analyzing rent control 
ordinances in this way); Centner, supra note 140, at 129–35 (arguing in favor of such an 
analysis citing Tahoe-Sierra and Yee).  
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still succeed by showing “peculiar and substantial” damages.335 In this 
sense, Penn Central inquiry provides a useful framework in which to 
assess whether the harm goes beyond “incidental damages arising 
from a legalized nuisance.”336 Further analysis of the North Carolina 
RTF law under existing Takings Clause jurisprudence will help assess 
potential outcomes under these different approaches.  
C. Analysis of North Carolina’s RTF Act under the Takings Clause  
 The extension of immunity to agricultural and forestry 
operations under North Carolina’s RTF statute raises constitutional 
concerns under the Takings Clause, particularly as a regulatory 
taking.337 Under a broad reading of the statute, the law could permit 
unbounded modifications in size or type of agricultural product for 
existing agricultural or forestry facilities.338 These expansive 
protections run contrary to the equitable considerations inherent 
within the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine.339 As previously 
discussed, there is some case law to support a finding that the 
maintenance of an ongoing nuisance could give rise to a compensable 
taking.340 Drawing an analogy to the award of permanent damages in 
nuisance law, a court could hold that the grant of nuisance immunity 
 
335.  Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, (1914). See Moon v. N. Idaho 
Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 645 (Idaho 2004) (recognizing the plaintiffs may be entitled to 
“special and peculiar” damages, but holding they failed to meet the burden of showing 
such damages existed). 
336.  Richards, 233 U.S. at 554; cf. Ball, supra note 296, at 850 n.170 (noting the 
applicability of the Penn Central inquiry to nuisance-related cases, but arguing that a 
heightened form of scrutiny is needed).  
337.  See Centner, supra note 140, at 88–89. Under the existing statute of limitations, 
landowners who have already been subjected to a nuisance from an agricultural facility for 
more than two years would likely be precluded from bringing an inverse condemnation 
action. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	40A-51(a) (2015); Peach v. City of High Point, 199 N.C. 
App. 359, 368, 683 S.E.2d 717, 724 (2009) (“The rule is that a statute of limitations on an 
inverse condemnation claim begins running when plaintiffs’ property first suffers injury.”) 
(quoting Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88, 91, 497 S.E.2d 300, 302, disc. 
review denied, 348 N.C. 500, 510 S.E.2d 654 (1998)). 
338.  See supra Section III.D. 
339.  See Centner, supra note 140, at 140 (“Statutes that allow major expansion or 
extensive changes might produce an unconstitutional taking.”). Indeed, it is difficult to 
conceive of “background principles of nuisance and property law” that would justify this 
type of intrusion into the property rights of neighboring landowners. See Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992) (holding that regulations prohibiting the 
development of a beachfront property constituted a compensable taking unless the state 
met its burden of identifying a background principle of state law that supported a 
restriction).  
340.  See supra notes 292–300 and accompanying text. 
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results in the creation of a constitutionally protected easement.341 
However, considering the relevant case law regarding the 
constitutionality of RTF laws, it is doubtful that a court would hold 
that the nuisance immunity provided under the RTF law would give 
rise to a categorical taking under either the Fifth Amendment or the 
North Carolina Constitution.342 
While often overlooked in the federal and state takings 
jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of RTF statutes,343 the 
North Carolina RTF law could also be found unconstitutional as a 
regulatory taking under the traditional Penn Central balancing test.344 
The expansive immunity provided under the North Carolina RTF law 
raises legitimate questions about whether the law’s application is 
“forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”345  
Applying the factors identified in Penn Central, an agricultural 
facility that undergoes a significant change in operation presents a 
strong argument in favor of finding an unconstitutional taking. For 
example, a neighboring farm that converts from a soybean farming 
operation to an industrial hog facility could raise significant concerns 
under the traditional Penn Central inquiry, assuming the defendant 
 
341.  See Brown v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 162 N.C. 83, 87, 77 S.E. 1102, 1104 
(1913) (noting that in a nuisance action for permanent damages, “the suit then amounts to 
the partial taking of another’s property, and it becomes in effect a proceeding to condemn 
on the complainant’s land an easement to operate the plant for all time in the specified 
way	.	.	.	.”); Broadbent v. Allison, 176 N.C. App. 359, 363, 626 S.E.2d 758, 762 (2006) 
((“When permanent damages are at issue in a nuisance trial, and that nuisance ‘operates 
as a partial taking of the plaintiff's property, any resulting benefit peculiar to him may be 
considered in mitigation of damages.’	”) (quoting Brown, 162 N.C. at 87, 77 S.E. at 1104)).  
342.  There remains a credible argument that the “nexus”/“rough proportionality” 
test that the Supreme Court has applied in the context of government permitting decisions 
may be applicable here. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2600 (2013). However, in contrast to a permit requirement or fee, the creation of a 
nuisance poses a much more indirect imposition of liability. For this reason, it seems 
unlikely that this precedent would be extended to cover such cases. See id. at 2599–600 
(emphasizing demand for monetary payment).  
343.  See Centner, supra note 140, at 129–35 (arguing in favor of the application of 
the Penn Central inquiry).  
344.  See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 
(2002) (noting that “if petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to their 
individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might have 
prevailed under a Penn Central analysis”). Alternatively, a plaintiff may be able to succeed 
by showing the incurrence of “peculiar and substantial” damages. Richards v. Wash. 
Terminal Co. 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914); see Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 96 P.3d 637, 
645 (Idaho 2004) (recognizing the plaintiffs may be entitled to “special and peculiar” 
damages, but holding they failed to meet the burden of showing such damages existed). 
345.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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could successfully raise an affirmative defense under the RTF law.346 
First and foremost, the imposition of nuisance immunity in such cases 
would have a significant economic impact on the neighboring 
landowner.347 The negative impact of CAFOs on neighboring 
property values has been well established.348 Assuming that the 
neighboring landowner preceded the defendant’s change in 
operation, the consideration of “investment-backed expectations” 
could provide strong support in favor of a regulatory taking since the 
extent of the nuisance was unknown at the time of purchase.349 This 
determination would likely depend on the extent to which similar 
facilities were already operating in the surrounding area.  
 On the other hand, the “character of the government action” in 
this case may weigh against finding a compensable taking, particularly 
considering the stated policy of the RTF law to “conserve and protect 
and encourage the development and improvement of [ ] agricultural 
land and forestland.”350 The ubiquitous nature of RTF laws across the 
country and longstanding application in North Carolina provide 
further support for finding the amended RTF law to be constitutional.  
Nevertheless, the effective removal of many of the equitable 
considerations under the “coming to the nuisance” doctrine raises 
concerns about whether the amended RTF law represents a “public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”351 As noted, the amended statute would 
allow industrial agricultural facilities to effectively tack on prior 
agricultural uses.352 This retroactive application of the statute to 
existing homeowners living near smaller farms also “implicates 
fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause”353 
and requires longstanding residents of a community to endure the 
nuisance associated with CAFOs.  
 
346.  See supra Section III.D (discussing potential interpretations of the statute). 
347.  Richards & Richards, supra note 64, at 38–39. 
348.  Id.  
349.  In this sense, a case brought by a residential developer, as in Durham v. Britt, 
presents a much more compelling case for finding an unconstitutional taking that those 
presented the homeowner in Lindsey v. DeGroot due to their respective “investment-
backed expectations.” See Durham v. Britt, 117 N.C. App. 250, 251, 451 S.E.2d 1, 1 (1994); 
Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
350.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015). Indeed, the consideration of the cumulative 
impacts of agricultural facilities on their surrounding communities may provide further 
support for such a finding.  
351.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
352.  See supra notes 337–351 and accompanying text. 
353.  See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (emphasizing the retroactive 
imposition of liability as a factor in favor of finding a compensable taking). 
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While North Carolina courts arguably have more leeway to find 
that a compensable taking has occurred,354 a plaintiff would still likely 
face a heavy burden bringing this claim absent evidence of a near or 
total depreciation in value in the property.355 However, a neighboring 
landowner may be able to argue that the grant of nuisance immunity 
to an industrial agricultural or forestry facility constituted “a 
substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the 
ownership of the property.”356 
CONCLUSION 
By extending nuisance immunity beyond the traditional doctrine 
of “coming to the nuisance,” the North Carolina General Assembly 
has provided an unreasonable framework to accomplish the stated 
purpose of the law “to conserve and protect and encourage the 
development and improvement of its agricultural land and 
forestland” within the state.357 In contrast to the limitations 
previously recognized by the North Carolina Court of Appeals,358 the 
amended RTF law in North Carolina reflects a competing vision 
about the future of agriculture within the state. The extensive 
protections provided to all agricultural operations “without 
limitation” fail to account for the rights of neighboring landowners 
within these rural communities.359 As a result of the 2013 
amendments, it remains to be seen how the courts will interpret the 
statutory revisions. However, the constitutional concerns raised by 
these amendments favor a narrow interpretation of the law that is 
consistent with the original intent of the act.  
Contrary to the stated purpose of the law, the RTF law’s blanket 
protections for CAFOs and industrial forestry operations against 
nuisance claims by neighboring landowners raises legitimate 
questions about what kind of agricultural land and forestland the 
government should protect.360 As seen from William Aldred’s Case, as 
 
354.  As seen in Gacke, federal takings law does not preclude a state court from 
providing additional protections for rights that may not be expressly recognized under the 
United States Constitution. Gacke v. Pork Extra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 
2004); see Centner, supra note 140, at 140–41. 
355.  See supra notes 289–295 (discussing the interpretation of taking claims by North 
Carolina state courts). 
356.  Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., __, N.C. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 919, 925 (2016) 
(quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 198–99, 293 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1982)). 
357.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-700 (2015). 
358.  See supra Section II.C. 
359.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §	106-701(b) (2015).  
360.  See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1738. 
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well as the pending tort litigation in North Carolina, land use conflicts 
between agricultural and non-agricultural uses will continue to create 
tension between the respect for property rights as well as the best use 
of North Carolina’s resources. The extensive protections provided to 
agricultural facilities unduly limit the fair allocation of resources and 
rights under the law. A more balanced approach is needed to provide 
a sustainable model for agricultural development in the state. 
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